Re: [PATCH v4 15/29] x86/mm/64: Enable vmapped stacks

[Andy Lutomirski]

On Mon, Jun 27, 2016 at 8:12 AM, Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 27, 2016 at 11:01 AM, Brian Gerst <brgerst@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On Sun, Jun 26, 2016 at 5:55 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> This allows x86_64 kernels to enable vmapped stacks.  There are a
>>> couple of interesting bits.
>>>
>>> First, x86 lazily faults in top-level paging entries for the vmalloc
>>> area.  This won't work if we get a page fault while trying to access
>>> the stack: the CPU will promote it to a double-fault and we'll die.
>>> To avoid this problem, probe the new stack when switching stacks and
>>> forcibly populate the pgd entry for the stack when switching mms.
>>>
>>> Second, once we have guard pages around the stack, we'll want to
>>> detect and handle stack overflow.
>>>
>>> I didn't enable it on x86_32.  We'd need to rework the double-fault
>>> code a bit and I'm concerned about running out of vmalloc virtual
>>> addresses under some workloads.
>>>
>>> This patch, by itself, will behave somewhat erratically when the
>>> stack overflows while RSP is still more than a few tens of bytes
>>> above the bottom of the stack.  Specifically, we'll get #PF and make
>>> it to no_context and an oops without triggering a double-fault, and
>>> no_context doesn't know about stack overflows.  The next patch will
>>> improve that case.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>>  arch/x86/Kconfig                 |  1 +
>>>  arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
>>>  arch/x86/kernel/traps.c          | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>>  arch/x86/mm/tlb.c                | 15 +++++++++++++++
>>>  4 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>>> index d9a94da0c29f..afdcf96ef109 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>>> @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ config X86
>>>         select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
>>>         select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
>>>         select HAVE_EBPF_JIT                    if X86_64
>>> +       select HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK             if X86_64
>>>         select HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
>>>         select HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE
>>>         select HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
>>> index 8f321a1b03a1..14e4b20f0aaf 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/switch_to.h
>>> @@ -8,6 +8,28 @@ struct tss_struct;
>>>  void __switch_to_xtra(struct task_struct *prev_p, struct task_struct *next_p,
>>>                       struct tss_struct *tss);
>>>
>>> +/* This runs runs on the previous thread's stack. */
>>> +static inline void prepare_switch_to(struct task_struct *prev,
>>> +                                    struct task_struct *next)
>>> +{
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
>>> +       /*
>>> +        * If we switch to a stack that has a top-level paging entry
>>> +        * that is not present in the current mm, the resulting #PF will
>>> +        * will be promoted to a double-fault and we'll panic.  Probe
>>> +        * the new stack now so that vmalloc_fault can fix up the page
>>> +        * tables if needed.  This can only happen if we use a stack
>>> +        * in vmap space.
>>> +        *
>>> +        * We assume that the stack is aligned so that it never spans
>>> +        * more than one top-level paging entry.
>>> +        *
>>> +        * To minimize cache pollution, just follow the stack pointer.
>>> +        */
>>> +       READ_ONCE(*(unsigned char *)next->thread.sp);
>>> +#endif
>>> +}
>>> +
>>>  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
>>>
>>>  #ifdef CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR
>>> @@ -39,6 +61,8 @@ do {                                                                  \
>>>          */                                                             \
>>>         unsigned long ebx, ecx, edx, esi, edi;                          \
>>>                                                                         \
>>> +       prepare_switch_to(prev, next);                                  \
>>> +                                                                       \
>>>         asm volatile("pushl %%ebp\n\t"          /* save    EBP   */     \
>>>                      "movl %%esp,%[prev_sp]\n\t"        /* save    ESP   */ \
>>>                      "movl %[next_sp],%%esp\n\t"        /* restore ESP   */ \
>>> @@ -103,7 +127,9 @@ do {                                                                        \
>>>   * clean in kernel mode, with the possible exception of IOPL.  Kernel IOPL
>>>   * has no effect.
>>>   */
>>> -#define switch_to(prev, next, last) \
>>> +#define switch_to(prev, next, last)                                      \
>>> +       prepare_switch_to(prev, next);                                    \
>>> +                                                                         \
>>>         asm volatile(SAVE_CONTEXT                                         \
>>>              "movq %%rsp,%P[threadrsp](%[prev])\n\t" /* save RSP */       \
>>>              "movq %P[threadrsp](%[next]),%%rsp\n\t" /* restore RSP */    \
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
>>> index 00f03d82e69a..9cb7ea781176 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/traps.c
>>> @@ -292,12 +292,30 @@ DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_NP,     SIGBUS,  "segment not present", segment_not_present)
>>>  DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_SS,     SIGBUS,  "stack segment",            stack_segment)
>>>  DO_ERROR(X86_TRAP_AC,     SIGBUS,  "alignment check",          alignment_check)
>>>
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
>>> +static void __noreturn handle_stack_overflow(const char *message,
>>> +                                            struct pt_regs *regs,
>>> +                                            unsigned long fault_address)
>>> +{
>>> +       printk(KERN_EMERG "BUG: stack guard page was hit at %p (stack is %p..%p)\n",
>>> +                (void *)fault_address, current->stack,
>>> +                (char *)current->stack + THREAD_SIZE - 1);
>>> +       die(message, regs, 0);
>>> +
>>> +       /* Be absolutely certain we don't return. */
>>> +       panic(message);
>>> +}
>>> +#endif
>>> +
>>>  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>>>  /* Runs on IST stack */
>>>  dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
>>>  {
>>>         static const char str[] = "double fault";
>>>         struct task_struct *tsk = current;
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
>>> +       unsigned long cr2;
>>> +#endif
>>>
>>>  #ifdef CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64
>>>         extern unsigned char native_irq_return_iret[];
>>> @@ -332,6 +350,20 @@ dotraplinkage void do_double_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
>>>         tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
>>>         tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_DF;
>>>
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_VMAP_STACK
>>> +       /*
>>> +        * If we overflow the stack into a guard page, the CPU will fail
>>> +        * to deliver #PF and will send #DF instead.  CR2 will contain
>>> +        * the linear address of the second fault, which will be in the
>>> +        * guard page below the bottom of the stack.
>>> +        */
>>> +       cr2 = read_cr2();
>>> +       if ((unsigned long)tsk->stack - 1 - cr2 < PAGE_SIZE)
>>> +               handle_stack_overflow(
>>> +                       "kernel stack overflow (double-fault)",
>>> +                       regs, cr2);
>>> +#endif
>>
>> Is there any other way to tell if this was from a page fault?  If it
>> wasn't a page fault then CR2 is undefined.
>
> I guess it doesn't really matter, since the fault is fatal either way.
> The error message might be incorrect though.
>

It's at least worth a comment, though.  Maybe I should check if
regs->rsp is within 40 bytes of the bottom of the stack, too, such
that delivery of an inner fault would have double-faulted assuming the
inner fault didn't use an IST vector.

--Andy