On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 02:43:00PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
On 06/24/2016 01:48 PM, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:Does it have any other qualities that would make this better than bind
On Fri, Jun 24, 2016 at 10:36:55AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:And I am not sure how to go about this. TPM2 by the way doesn't have such
Introduce TPM_VTPM_PROXY_NO_SYSFS flag that prevents a vtpm_proxy driverNo other subsystem does something so goofy, this really needs to be
instance from having the typical sysfs entries that shows the state of the
TPM. The flag is to be set in the ioctl creating the vtpm_proxy device
pair and maps on a new chip flags TPM_CHIP_FLAG_NO_SYSFS.
part of namespace support for TPM.
entries, so it's much better from that perspective.
Why can't you just make the sysfs files unreadable in user space?There are actually ways to go about this. Likely bind-mounting over
/sys/device/virtual/tpm would be one solution to hide all virtual TPM
device. Another is applying an AppArmor policy to the container denying
access to tpm directories or entries. SELinux would not be so easy.
The flag in this patch seemed like a 'cheap' way to eliminate that problem
as well.
mounting?
/Jarkko