Re: [PATCH v3 00/11] mm: Hardened usercopy

[Kees Cook]

On Wed, Jul 20, 2016 at 2:52 AM, David Laight <David.Laight@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> From: Kees Cook
>> Sent: 15 July 2016 22:44
>> This is a start of the mainline port of PAX_USERCOPY[1].
> ...
>> - if address range is in the current process stack, it must be within the
>>   current stack frame (if such checking is possible) or at least entirely
>>   within the current process's stack.
> ...
>
> That description doesn't seem quite right to me.
> I presume the check is:
>   Within the current process's stack and not crossing the ends of the
>   current stack frame.

Actually, it's a bad description all around. :) The check is that the
range is within a valid stack frame (current or any prior caller's
frame). i.e. it does not cross a frame or touch the saved frame
pointer nor instruction pointer.

> The 'current' stack frame is likely to be that of copy_to/from_user().
> Even if you use the stack of the caller, any problematic buffers
> are likely to have been passed in from a calling function.
> So unless you are going to walk the stack (good luck on that)
> I'm not sure checking the stack frames is worth it.

Yup: that's exactly what it's doing: walking up the stack. :)

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Chrome OS & Brillo Security