Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH 1/2] security, perf: allow further restriction of perf_event_open

[Daniel Micay]

> > So the problem I have with this is that it will completely inhibit
> > development of things like JITs that self-profile to re-compile
> > frequently used code.
> 
> Or reimplement strace with sys_perf_event_open(), speeding it up
> greatly
> by not using ptrace (see 'perf trace', one such attempt), combining it
> with sys_bpf(), which can run unpriviledged as well, provides lots of
> possibilities for efficient tooling that would be greatly stiffled by
> such big hammer restrictions :-(

The usage on Android wouldn't impact strace. It's a debugging tool used
over the debugging shell so it could be taught to toggle on unprivileged
access to perf events as the other tools using the API were.

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