[PATCH 4.7 131/184] perf/x86/intel/pt: Do validate the size of a kernel address filter

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.7-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

commit 1155bafcb79208abc6ae234c6e135ac70607755c upstream.

Right now, the kernel address filters in PT are prone to integer overflow
that may happen in adding filter's size to its offset to obtain the end
of the range. Such an overflow would also throw a #GP in the PT event
configuration path.

Fix this by explicitly validating the result of this calculation.

Reported-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: vince@xxxxxxxxxx
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20160915151352.21306-4-alexander.shishkin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
 arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c |    9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/pt.c
@@ -1089,8 +1089,13 @@ static int pt_event_addr_filters_validat
 		if (!filter->range || !filter->size)
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-		if (!filter->inode && !valid_kernel_ip(filter->offset))
-			return -EINVAL;
+		if (!filter->inode) {
+			if (!valid_kernel_ip(filter->offset))
+				return -EINVAL;
+
+			if (!valid_kernel_ip(filter->offset + filter->size))
+				return -EINVAL;
+		}
 
 		if (++range > pt_cap_get(PT_CAP_num_address_ranges))
 			return -EOPNOTSUPP;