[PATCH RFC] user-namespaced file capabilities - now with even more magic

[Serge E. Hallyn]

Root in a user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
security.capability xattr.  If it were allowed to do so, then any
unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a
namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
host.

This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr.  It builds a
vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct
vfs_cap_data.  This is the absolute uid_t (i.e. the uid_t in
init_user_ns) of the root id (uid 0 in a namespace) in whose namespaces
the file capabilities may take effect.

When a task in a user ns (which is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP toward
that user_ns) asks to write v2 security.capability, the kernel will
transparently rewrite the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid.
Subsequently, any task executing the file which has the noted kuid as
its root uid, or which is in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns,
will run the file with capabilities.

If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a
uid (valid within its own user namespace, over which it has CAP_SETFCAP)
for the xattr.  The kernel will translate that to the absolute uid, and
write that to disk.  After this, a task in the writer's namespace will
not be able to use those capabilities, but a task in a namespace where
the given uid is root will.

Only a single security.capability xattr may be written.  A task may
overwrite the existing one so long as it was written by a user mapped
into his own user_ns over which he has CAP_SETFCAP.

This allows a simple setxattr to work, allows tar/untar to work, and
allows us to tar in one namespace and untar in another while preserving
the capability, without risking leaking privilege into a parent
namespace.

Changelog:
   Nov 02 2016: fix invalid check at refuse_fcap_overwrite()
   Nov 07 2016: convert rootid from and to fs user_ns
---
 fs/xattr.c                      |  27 +++-
 include/linux/capability.h      |   5 +-
 include/linux/security.h        |   2 +
 include/uapi/linux/capability.h |  22 ++-
 security/commoncap.c            | 335 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 5 files changed, 366 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index 2d13b4e..e9e70f1 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -171,11 +171,27 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 {
 	struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
 	int error = -EAGAIN;
+	void *wvalue = NULL;
+	size_t wsize = 0;
 	int issec = !strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
 				   XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX_LEN);
 
-	if (issec)
+	if (issec) {
 		inode->i_flags &= ~S_NOSEC;
+
+		/* if root in a non-init user_ns tries to set
+		 * security.capability, write the virtualized
+		 * xattr in its place */
+		if (!strcmp(name, "security.capability") &&
+				current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) {
+			cap_setxattr_make_nscap(dentry, value, size, &wvalue, &wsize);
+			if (!wvalue)
+				return -EPERM;
+			value = wvalue;
+			size = wsize;
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR) {
 		error = __vfs_setxattr(dentry, inode, name, value, size, flags);
 		if (!error) {
@@ -184,8 +200,10 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 						     size, flags);
 		}
 	} else {
-		if (unlikely(is_bad_inode(inode)))
-			return -EIO;
+		if (unlikely(is_bad_inode(inode))) {
+			error = -EIO;
+			goto out;
+		}
 	}
 	if (error == -EAGAIN) {
 		error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -200,10 +218,11 @@ int __vfs_setxattr_noperm(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		}
 	}
 
+out:
+	kfree(wvalue);
 	return error;
 }
 
-
 int
 vfs_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value,
 		size_t size, int flags)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index dbc21c7..edd5be1 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 #define _LINUX_CAPABILITY_H
 
 #include <uapi/linux/capability.h>
-
+#include <linux/uidgid.h>
 
 #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_VERSION _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3
 #define _KERNEL_CAPABILITY_U32S    _LINUX_CAPABILITY_U32S_3
@@ -246,4 +246,7 @@ extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns,
 /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
 extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
 
+extern void cap_setxattr_make_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, const void *value,
+		size_t size, void **wvalue, size_t *wsize);
+
 #endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index c2125e9..3127531 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
 extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
 extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
+extern int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+				 void **buffer, bool alloc);
 extern int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
 extern int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index 49bc062..fd4f87d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -60,9 +60,13 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
 #define VFS_CAP_U32_2           2
 #define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2         (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2))
 
-#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ           XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
-#define VFS_CAP_U32             VFS_CAP_U32_2
-#define VFS_CAP_REVISION	VFS_CAP_REVISION_2
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_3	0x03000000
+#define VFS_CAP_U32_3           2
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3         (sizeof(__le32)*(2 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_3))
+
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ           XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3
+#define VFS_CAP_U32             VFS_CAP_U32_3
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION	VFS_CAP_REVISION_3
 
 struct vfs_cap_data {
 	__le32 magic_etc;            /* Little endian */
@@ -72,6 +76,18 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
 	} data[VFS_CAP_U32];
 };
 
+/*
+ * same as vfs_cap_data but with a rootid at the end
+ */
+struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
+	__le32 magic_etc;
+	struct {
+		__le32 permitted;    /* Little endian */
+		__le32 inheritable;  /* Little endian */
+	} data[VFS_CAP_U32];
+	__le32 rootid;
+};
+
 #ifndef __KERNEL__
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 8df676f..1f189b2 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -332,6 +332,272 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return error;
 }
 
+static bool rootid_owns_currentns(kuid_t kroot)
+{
+	struct user_namespace *ns;
+
+	if (!uid_valid(kroot))
+		return false;
+
+	for (ns = current_user_ns(); ; ns = ns->parent) {
+		if (from_kuid(ns, kroot) == 0) {
+			return true;
+		}
+		if (ns == &init_user_ns)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return false;
+}
+
+static char *cap_convert_v2_v3(char *buf, struct inode *inode)
+{
+	char *ret;
+	struct vfs_ns_cap_data *v3;
+	struct vfs_cap_data *v2 = (struct vfs_cap_data *)buf;
+	kuid_t krootid;
+
+	krootid = make_kuid(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, 0);
+	if (!uid_valid(krootid)) {
+		ret = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ret = kmalloc(sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data), GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!ret) {
+		ret = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	v3 = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *)ret;
+
+	memcpy(&v3->data, &v2->data, sizeof(v2->data));
+	v3->magic_etc = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
+	if (v2->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
+		v3->magic_etc |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
+	v3->rootid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, krootid);
+
+out:
+	kfree(buf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the
+ * xattr from the inode itself.
+ *
+ * This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it.  If we
+ * return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler.
+ *
+ * Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called
+ * by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values -
+ * so that's good.
+ */
+int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
+			  bool alloc)
+{
+	int size, ret;
+	kuid_t kroot;
+	uid_t root, mappedroot;
+	char *tmpbuf = NULL;
+	struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
+	struct dentry *dentry;
+	struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
+
+	if (!inode->i_op->getxattr)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+	if (!dentry)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
+	ret = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, "security.capability",
+				 &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
+
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
+	if (ret == sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data) && fs_ns == &init_user_ns) {
+		/* If this is sizeof(vfs_cap_data) then we're ok with the
+		 * on-disk value, so return that.  */
+		if (alloc)
+			*buffer = tmpbuf;
+		else
+			kfree(tmpbuf);
+		return ret;
+	} else if (ret == sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data)) {
+		tmpbuf = cap_convert_v2_v3(tmpbuf, inode);
+		if (!tmpbuf)
+			return -EPERM;
+	} else if (ret != size) {
+		kfree(tmpbuf);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
+	root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
+	kroot = make_kuid(fs_ns, root);
+
+	/* If the root kuid maps to a valid uid in current ns, then return
+	 * this as a nscap. */
+	mappedroot = from_kuid(current_user_ns(), kroot);
+	if (mappedroot != (uid_t)-1) {
+		if (alloc) {
+			*buffer = tmpbuf;
+			nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot);
+		} else
+			kfree(tmpbuf);
+		return size;
+	}
+
+	if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) {
+		kfree(tmpbuf);
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	/* This comes from a parent namespace.  Return as a v2 capability */
+	size = sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data);
+	if (alloc) {
+		*buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
+		if (*buffer) {
+			struct vfs_cap_data *cap = *buffer;
+			__le32 nsmagic, magic;
+			magic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
+			nsmagic = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc);
+			if (nsmagic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
+				magic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
+			memcpy(&cap->data, &nscap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
+			cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic);
+		}
+	}
+	kfree(tmpbuf);
+	return size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Root can only overwite an existing security.capability xattr
+ * if it is privileged over the root listed in the xattr
+ * Note we've already checked for ns_capable(CAP_SETFCAP) in the
+ * !capable_wrt_inode_uidgid() call by the caller, so we do not
+ * check for that here.
+ */
+static bool refuse_fcap_overwrite(struct inode *inode)
+{
+	void *tmpbuf;
+	int ret;
+	uid_t root;
+	kuid_t kroot;
+	struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
+	__u32 magic_etc;
+	bool should_refuse;
+	struct user_namespace *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
+
+	ret = cap_inode_getsecurity(inode, "capability", &tmpbuf, true);
+	if (ret < 0)
+		return false;
+	if (ret == sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data) && fs_ns == &init_user_ns) {
+		/*
+		 * host-root-installed capability, user-namespace-root may
+		 * not overwrite this.
+		 * TODO - if inode->i_sb->s_user_ns != &init_user_ns we do
+		 * in fact want to allow it.
+		 */
+		kfree(tmpbuf);
+		return true;
+	}
+	if (ret < sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data)) {
+		/* Corrupt fscap.  Caller is privileged wrt inode, permit fixup */
+		kfree(tmpbuf);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *)tmpbuf;
+
+	magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc);
+	if ((magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) != VFS_CAP_REVISION_3) {
+		/*
+		 * This version is newer than we know about - i.e. from a newer
+		 * kernel.  Don't overwrite.
+		*/
+		kfree(tmpbuf);
+		return true;
+	}
+	if (ret != sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data)) {
+		/* Corrupt v4 fscap.  Permit fixup */
+		kfree(tmpbuf);
+		return false;
+	}
+	root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
+	kroot = make_kuid(&init_user_ns, root);
+	should_refuse = !kuid_has_mapping(current_user_ns(), kroot);
+	kfree(tmpbuf);
+	return should_refuse;
+}
+
+static kuid_t rootid_from_xattr(const void *value, size_t size,
+				struct user_namespace *task_ns)
+{
+	const struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = value;
+	uid_t rootid = 0;
+
+	if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
+		rootid = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
+
+	return make_kuid(task_ns, rootid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Use requested a write of security.capability but is in a non-init
+ * userns.  So we construct and write a v4.
+ *
+ * If all is ok, wvalue has an allocated new value.  Otherwise, wvalue
+ * is NULL.
+ */
+void cap_setxattr_make_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, const void *value, size_t size,
+				    void **wvalue, size_t *wsize)
+{
+	struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
+	const struct vfs_cap_data *cap = value;
+	__u32 magic, nsmagic;
+	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+	struct user_namespace *task_ns = current_user_ns(),
+		*fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
+	kuid_t rootid;
+
+	if (!value)
+		return;
+	if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 && size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
+		return;
+	if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
+		return;
+
+	/* refuse if security.capability exists */
+	if (refuse_fcap_overwrite(inode))
+		return;
+
+	rootid = rootid_from_xattr(value, size, task_ns);
+	if (!uid_valid(rootid))
+		return;
+
+	*wsize = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
+	nscap = kmalloc(*wsize, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!nscap)
+		return;
+	nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(from_kuid(fs_ns, rootid));
+	nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
+	magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc);
+	if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
+		nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
+	nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic);
+	memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
+
+	*wvalue = nscap;
+	return;
+}
+
 /*
  * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
  * to a file.
@@ -385,7 +651,10 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
 	__u32 magic_etc;
 	unsigned tocopy, i;
 	int size;
-	struct vfs_cap_data caps;
+	struct vfs_ns_cap_data data, *nscaps = &data;
+	struct vfs_cap_data *caps = (struct vfs_cap_data *) &data;
+	kuid_t rootkuid;
+	struct user_namespace *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
 
 	memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
 
@@ -393,17 +662,18 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
 		return -ENODATA;
 
 	size = __vfs_getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, inode,
-			      XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &caps, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
+			      XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &data, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
 	if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 		/* no data, that's ok */
 		return -ENODATA;
+
 	if (size < 0)
 		return size;
 
 	if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps.magic_etc);
+	cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
 
 	switch (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) {
 	case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
@@ -414,8 +684,25 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
 	case VFS_CAP_REVISION_2:
 		if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
 			return -EINVAL;
+		if (fs_ns != &init_user_ns) {
+			/* unpriv user mounted this fs;  make sure they
+			 * own current user_ns */
+			rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, 0);
+			if (!rootid_owns_currentns(rootkuid))
+				return -ENODATA;
+		}
 		tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
 		break;
+	case VFS_CAP_REVISION_3:
+		if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_3;
+
+		rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, le32_to_cpu(nscaps->rootid));
+		if (!rootid_owns_currentns(rootkuid))
+			return -ENODATA;
+		break;
+
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
@@ -423,8 +710,8 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
 	CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
 		if (i >= tocopy)
 			break;
-		cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].permitted);
-		cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable);
+		cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
+		cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable);
 	}
 
 	cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
@@ -462,8 +749,8 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
 	rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
 	if (rc < 0) {
 		if (rc == -EINVAL)
-			printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
-				__func__, rc, bprm->filename);
+			printk(KERN_NOTICE "Invalid argument reading file caps for %s\n",
+					bprm->filename);
 		else if (rc == -ENODATA)
 			rc = 0;
 		goto out;
@@ -659,15 +946,21 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
 		       const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
 {
-	if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
+	/* Ignore non-security xattrs */
+	if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+			sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
+		/* Write from initial user_ns will in * __vfs_setxattr_noperm()
+		 * be diverted to a nscap write.  But from initial user_ns we
+		 * require CAP_SETFCAP targeted at init_user_ns */
+		if (current_user_ns() == &init_user_ns && !capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
 			return -EPERM;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
-		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
-	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -685,15 +978,22 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
  */
 int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
 {
-	if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
-		if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
+	/* Ignore non-security xattrs */
+	if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+			sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
+		/* security.capability gets namespaced */
+		struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+		if (!inode)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
 			return -EPERM;
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
-		     sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
-	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EPERM;
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -1081,6 +1381,7 @@ struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, cap_bprm_secureexec),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, cap_inode_getsecurity),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid),
-- 
2.7.4