Re: [PATCH 00/16] Kernel lockdown

[One Thousand Gnomes]

> This applies equally to the kernel command line, and given that we
> cannot authenticate it, we should whitelist params that we know to be
> safe, and filter out all others. A similar concern exists for the
> device tree on ARM/arm64, and we already disable the DTB loader in the
> UEFI stub if secure boot is enabled.

Or you sign the boot command line.

> > Without that at least fixed I don't see the point in merging this. Either
> > we don't do it (which given the level of security the current Linux
> > kernel provides, and also all the golden key messups from elsewhere might
> > be the honest approach), or at least try and do the job right.
> >
> > Less security is better than fake security. If you've got less security
> > your take appropriate precautions. If you rely on fake security you don't.
> >  
> 
> In general, I think kernel hardening is an important topic

It is - so pushing something with known trivial holes isn't a useful way
to do this. The module parameter hole needs to be addressed before this
is fit for upstream.

Alan