Re: [PATCH 6/7] efi: Handle secure boot from UEFI-2.6 [ver #7]
From: David Howells
Date: Tue Jan 31 2017 - 13:59:39 EST
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> > UEFI-2.6 adds a new variable, DeployedMode. If it exists, this must be 1
> > if we're to engage lockdown mode.
> > Reported-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> > Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Interestingly, the string 'DeployedMode' appears zero times in the
> EDK2 codebase, so I wonder if it makes any sense to merge this now.
> The string 'AuditMode' does appear once, but in a comment
It's in the standard, so shouldn't we check for it?
> In any case, the logic is not entirely correct either: apologies if it
> was me who caused any confusion here, but it seems DeployedMode could
> legally be 0 or 1 while secure boot is in fact enabled. It is actually
> AuditMode that should be taken into account here, i.e., if AuditMode
> == 1, the firmware ignores invalid or missing signatures. If
> SecureBoot == 0x1, SetupMode == 0x0 and AuditMode == 0x0 (or
> non-existent), signature verification is performed regardless of the
> value (or existence) of DeployedMode.
> So I propose to respin this patch to treat AuditMode == 0x1 as 'secure
> boot disabled', and ignore if it is missing.
Ummm... This might conflict what said:
| Since you seem to be using this to mean "is the platform locked down?",
| this looks to be no longer complete in the UEFI 2.6 world. If
| DeployedMode == 0, even if SecureBoot == 1 and SetupMode == 0, you can
| remove the platform key by writing 1 to AuditMode and gain control of
| the secure variables. The lock down state becomes DeployedMode == 1,
| SecureBoot == 1 and SetupMode == 0
| See the diagram on page 1817
Looking again at that diagram, should I be checking all four variables
(SecureBoot, SetupMode, DeployedMode and AuditMode)? And/or should I treat
audit mode differently to deployed mode?
Further, there doesn't seem to be a state in which SecureBoot is shown as