Re: [tpmdd-devel] [RFC] tpm2-space: add handling for global session exhaustion
From: James Bottomley
Date: Fri Feb 10 2017 - 12:39:13 EST
On Fri, 2017-02-10 at 04:03 -0600, Dr. Greg Wettstein wrote:
> On Feb 9, 11:24am, James Bottomley wrote:
> } Subject: Re: [tpmdd-devel] [RFC] tpm2-space: add handling for
> global sessi
> Good morning to everyone.
Is there any way you could fix your email client? It's setting In
-Reply-To: headers like this
In-reply-to: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> "Re: [tpmdd-devel] [RFC] tpm2-space: add handling for global session exhaustion" (Feb 9, 11:24am)
Not using the message id breaks threading for everyone.
> > On Thu, 2017-02-09 at 03:06 -0600, Dr. Greg Wettstein wrote:
> > > Referring back to Ken's comments about having 20+ clients waiting
> > > to
> > > get access to the hardware. Even with the focus in TPM2 on
> > > having it
> > > be more of a cryptographic accelerator are we convinced that the
> > > hardware is ever going to be fast enough for a model of having it
> > > directly service large numbers of transactions in something like
> > > a
> > > 'cloud' model?
> > It's already in use as such today:
> > https://tectonic.com/assets/pdf/TectonicTrustedComputing.pdf
> We are familiar with this work. I'm not sure, however, that this
> work is representative of the notion of using TPM hardware to support
> a transactional environment, particularly at the cloud/container
It allows for cloud clients to request attestations. The next step is
to allow containers to provision key material and PCR locked blobs
securely to the TPM for use by correctly attested containers all of
those are cloud scale use cases.
> There is not a great deal of technical detail on the CoreOS integrity
> architecture but it appears they are using TPM hardware to validate
> container integrity. I'm not sure this type of environment reflects
> the ability of TPM hardware to support transactional throughputs in
> an environment such as financial transaction processing.
OK, so in the cloud neither key provisioning nor attestation has a huge
latency requirement. This appears to be your concern? All I'd say is
that the fact that there are use cases that can work at cloud scale
doesn't mean that every use case can.
> Intel's Clear Container work cites the need to achieve container
> startup times of 150 milliseconds and they are currently claiming 45
> milliseconds as their optimal time. This work was designed to
> demonstrate the feasibility of providing virtual machine isolation
> guarantees to containers and as such one of the mandates was to
> achieve container start times comparable to standard namespaces.
There are ephemeral container use cases where the lifetimes are of this
order, but they're not every use case (In fact, even in the devops
environment, they're still a minority).
> I ran some very rough timing metrics on one of our Skylake
> development systems with hardware TPM2 support. Here are the elapsed
> times for two common verification operations which I assume would be
> at the heart of generating any type of reasonable integrity
> quote: 810 milliseconds
> verify signature: 635 milliseconds
That's interesting, my Skylake system has these figures down around
100ms or so ... however, I agree that 100ms is the order of this.
Which is still significant compared to container start times.
> This is with the verifying key loaded into the chip. The elapsed
> time to load and validate a key into the chip averages 1200
> milliseconds. Since we are discussing a resource manager which would
> be shuttling context into and out of the limited resource slots on
> the chip I believe it is valid to consider this overhead as well.
> This suggests that just a signature verification on the integrity of
> a container is a factor of 4.2 times greater then a well accepted
> start time metric for container technology.
Part of the way of reducing the latency is not to use the TPM for
things that don't require secrecy: container signature verification is
one such because the container is signed with a private key to which
you know the public component ... you can verify it on the host without
needing to trouble the TPM. We only use the TPM for state quotes,
unsealing and signature generation.
> Based on that I'm assuming that if TPM based integrity guarantees are
> being implemented they are only on ingress of the container into the
> cloud environment. I'm assuming an alternate methodology must be in
> place to protect against time of measurement/time of use issues.
> Maybe people have better TPM2 hardware then what we have. I was
> going to run this on a Kaby Lake reference system but it appears that
> TXT is causing some type of context depletion problems which we we
> need to run down.
> > We're also planning something like this in the IBM Cloud.
> I assume if there is an expection of true transactional times you
> either will have better hardware then current generation TPM2
> technology. Either that or I assume you will be using userspace
> simulators anchored with a hardware TPM trust root.
vTPM is a possibility, yes, so is making the TPM faster.
> Ken's reflection of having 21-22 competing transactions would appear
> to have problematic latency issues given our measurements.
Consider the canonical use case to be VPNaaS with a secure connection
back to the enterprise and the client key being the privacy guarded
material. The signature generation is once per channel re-key and you
have up to half the re-key interval to generate the re-key over the
control channel. In this use case, latency isn't a problem (most re
-key intervals are around 3000s) but volume is. VPNs are long running
not short running, so start up time isn't hugely relevant either.
Anyway, precisely what we're doing and how is getting off point. The
point is that there are existing cloud use cases for the TPM which can
cause high concurrency.
> I influence engineering for a company which builds deterministically
> modeled Linux platforms. We've spent a lot of time considering TPM2
> hardware bottlenecks since they constrain the rate at which we can
> validate platform behavioral measurements.
> We have a variation of this work which allows SGX OCALL's to validate
> platform behavior in order to provide a broader TCB resource spectrum
> to the enclave and hardware TPM performance is problematic there as
> > James
> Have a good weekend.
> }-- End of excerpt from James Bottomley
> As always,
> Dr. G.W. Wettstein, Ph.D. Enjellic Systems Development, LLC.
> 4206 N. 19th Ave. Specializing in information infra
> Fargo, ND 58102 development.
> PH: 701-281-1686
> FAX: 701-281-3949 EMAIL: greg@xxxxxxxxxxxx
> "After being a technician for 2 years, I've discovered if people took
> care of their health with the same reckless abandon as their
> half would be at the kitchen table on the phone with the hospital,
> to remove their appendix with a butter knife."
> -- Brian Jones