Re: net/xfrm: stack out-of-bounds in xfrm_flowi_sport

From: Dmitry Vyukov
Date: Tue Feb 14 2017 - 03:42:01 EST


On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 8:08 AM, Steffen Klassert
<steffen.klassert@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 03:46:56PM +0100, Dmitry Vyukov wrote:
>>
>> On commit 7089db84e356562f8ba737c29e472cc42d530dbc.
>>
>>
>> struct flowi4 fl4_stack allocated on stack in udp_sendmsg is being
>> casted to larger struct flowi and then accessed.
>
> Looks like the problem is when using IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses.
>
> Does the patch below help?


Steffen, can you please run the reproducer I provided?
I specifically spent time to supply you with a simple, reliable
reproducer. I am not even saying about adding a test case for the bug.
Kernel development practices seem to encourage developers to not
bother with tests. But at least testing a patch that you are sending
looks like a reasonable thing to do.
Thanks


> Subject: [PATCH RFC ipsec] xfrm: Don't use sk_family for socket policy lookups
>
> On IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses sk_family is AF_INET6,
> but the flow informations are created based on AF_INET.
> So the routing set up 'struct flowi4' but we try to
> access 'struct flowi6' what leads to an out of bounds
> access. Fix this by using the family we get with the
> dst_entry, like we do it for the standard policy lookup.
>
> Reported-by: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 9 ++++-----
> 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
> index b5e665b..4891b7b 100644
> --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
> +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c
> @@ -1216,7 +1216,7 @@ static inline int policy_to_flow_dir(int dir)
> }
>
> static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(const struct sock *sk, int dir,
> - const struct flowi *fl)
> + const struct flowi *fl, u16 family)
> {
> struct xfrm_policy *pol;
> struct net *net = sock_net(sk);
> @@ -1225,8 +1225,7 @@ static struct xfrm_policy *xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(const struct sock *sk, int dir,
> read_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_policy_lock);
> pol = rcu_dereference(sk->sk_policy[dir]);
> if (pol != NULL) {
> - bool match = xfrm_selector_match(&pol->selector, fl,
> - sk->sk_family);
> + bool match = xfrm_selector_match(&pol->selector, fl, family);
> int err = 0;
>
> if (match) {
> @@ -2221,7 +2220,7 @@ struct dst_entry *xfrm_lookup(struct net *net, struct dst_entry *dst_orig,
> sk = sk_const_to_full_sk(sk);
> if (sk && sk->sk_policy[XFRM_POLICY_OUT]) {
> num_pols = 1;
> - pols[0] = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, XFRM_POLICY_OUT, fl);
> + pols[0] = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, XFRM_POLICY_OUT, fl, family);
> err = xfrm_expand_policies(fl, family, pols,
> &num_pols, &num_xfrms);
> if (err < 0)
> @@ -2500,7 +2499,7 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
> pol = NULL;
> sk = sk_to_full_sk(sk);
> if (sk && sk->sk_policy[dir]) {
> - pol = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, dir, &fl);
> + pol = xfrm_sk_policy_lookup(sk, dir, &fl, family);
> if (IS_ERR(pol)) {
> XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINPOLERROR);
> return 0;
> --
> 1.9.1
>