Re: [PATCH] KEYS: encrypted: avoid encrypting/decrypting stack buffers

[Mimi Zohar]

On Sat, 2017-04-01 at 20:33 -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Sat, Apr 01, 2017 at 10:23:57PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> > On Sat, 2017-04-01 at 12:17 -0700, Eric Biggers wrote:
> > > From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > > 
> > > Since v4.9, the crypto API cannot (normally) be used to encrypt/decrypt
> > > stack buffers because the stack may be virtually mapped.  Fix this for
> > > the padding buffers in encrypted-keys by using ZERO_PAGE for the
> > > encryption padding and by allocating a temporary heap buffer for the
> > > decryption padding.
> > > 
> > > Tested with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y:
> > > 	keyctl new_session
> > > 	keyctl add user master "abcdefghijklmnop" @s
> > > 	keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "new user:master 25" @s)
> > > 	datablob="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
> > > 	keyctl unlink $keyid
> > > 	keyid=$(keyctl add encrypted desc "load $datablob" @s)
> > > 	datablob2="$(keyctl pipe $keyid)"
> > > 	[ "$datablob" = "$datablob2" ] && echo "Success!"
> > 
> > Have you created an encrypted key on a kernel without this patch and
> > attempted to load that key on a kernel with this patch? ÂDoes it still
> > work?
> > 
> 
> Yes, a key exported from an unpatched kernel (with DEBUG_SG and DEBUG_VIRTUAL
> turned off so it doesn't crash) can be loaded on a patched kernel, then exported
> again.  The exported data is identical.

This patch removes calculating the "padlen". ÂWill this change break
other use cases?

Mimi