Re: [PATCH] ebpf: verify the output of the JIT

From: Kees Cook
Date: Tue Apr 04 2017 - 18:18:13 EST

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On Tue, Apr 4, 2017 at 3:08 PM, Tycho Andersen <tycho@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> The goal of this patch is to protect the JIT against an attacker with a
> write-in-memory primitive. The JIT allocates a buffer which will eventually
> be marked +x, so we need to make sure that what was written to this buffer
> is what was intended.
>
> We acheive this by building a hash of the instruction buffer as
> instructions are emittted and then comparing that to a hash at the end of
> the JIT compile after the buffer has been marked read-only.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tycho Andersen <tycho@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> CC: MickaÃl SalaÃn <mic@xxxxxxxxxxx>

Cool! This closes the race condition on producing the JIT vs going
read-only. I wonder if it might be possible to make this a more
generic interface to the BPF which would be allocate the hash, provide
the update callback during emit, and then do the hash check itself at
the end of bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro()?

-Kees

> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 11 ++++
> arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 147 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> 2 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index cc98d5a..7b2db2c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -2789,6 +2789,17 @@ config X86_DMA_REMAP
>
> source "net/Kconfig"
>
> +config EBPF_JIT_HASH_OUTPUT
> + def_bool y
> + depends on HAVE_EBPF_JIT
> + depends on BPF_JIT
> + select CRYPTO_SHA256
> + ---help---
> + Enables a double check of the JIT's output after it is marked read-only to
> + ensure that it matches what the JIT generated.
> +
> + Note, only applies when /proc/sys/net/core/bpf_jit_harden > 0.
> +
> source "drivers/Kconfig"
>
> source "drivers/firmware/Kconfig"
> diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> index 32322ce..be1271e 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
> @@ -13,9 +13,15 @@
> #include <linux/if_vlan.h>
> #include <asm/cacheflush.h>
> #include <linux/bpf.h>
> +#include <linux/crypto.h>
> +#include <crypto/hash.h>
>
> int bpf_jit_enable __read_mostly;
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_EBPF_JIT_HASH_OUTPUT
> +struct crypto_shash *tfm __read_mostly;
> +#endif
> +
> /*
> * assembly code in arch/x86/net/bpf_jit.S
> */
> @@ -25,7 +31,8 @@ extern u8 sk_load_byte_positive_offset[];
> extern u8 sk_load_word_negative_offset[], sk_load_half_negative_offset[];
> extern u8 sk_load_byte_negative_offset[];
>
> -static u8 *emit_code(u8 *ptr, u32 bytes, unsigned int len)
> +static u8 *emit_code(u8 *ptr, u32 bytes, unsigned int len,
> + struct shash_desc *hash)
> {
> if (len == 1)
> *ptr = bytes;
> @@ -35,11 +42,15 @@ static u8 *emit_code(u8 *ptr, u32 bytes, unsigned int len)
> *(u32 *)ptr = bytes;
> barrier();
> }
> +
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EBPF_JIT_HASH_OUTPUT) && hash)
> + crypto_shash_update(hash, (u8 *) &bytes, len);
> +
> return ptr + len;
> }
>
> #define EMIT(bytes, len) \
> - do { prog = emit_code(prog, bytes, len); cnt += len; } while (0)
> + do { prog = emit_code(prog, bytes, len, hash); cnt += len; } while (0)
>
> #define EMIT1(b1) EMIT(b1, 1)
> #define EMIT2(b1, b2) EMIT((b1) + ((b2) << 8), 2)
> @@ -206,7 +217,7 @@ struct jit_context {
> /* emit x64 prologue code for BPF program and check it's size.
> * bpf_tail_call helper will skip it while jumping into another program
> */
> -static void emit_prologue(u8 **pprog)
> +static void emit_prologue(u8 **pprog, struct shash_desc *hash)
> {
> u8 *prog = *pprog;
> int cnt = 0;
> @@ -264,7 +275,7 @@ static void emit_prologue(u8 **pprog)
> * goto *(prog->bpf_func + prologue_size);
> * out:
> */
> -static void emit_bpf_tail_call(u8 **pprog)
> +static void emit_bpf_tail_call(u8 **pprog, struct shash_desc *hash)
> {
> u8 *prog = *pprog;
> int label1, label2, label3;
> @@ -328,7 +339,7 @@ static void emit_bpf_tail_call(u8 **pprog)
> }
>
>
> -static void emit_load_skb_data_hlen(u8 **pprog)
> +static void emit_load_skb_data_hlen(u8 **pprog, struct shash_desc *hash)
> {
> u8 *prog = *pprog;
> int cnt = 0;
> @@ -348,7 +359,8 @@ static void emit_load_skb_data_hlen(u8 **pprog)
> }
>
> static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image,
> - int oldproglen, struct jit_context *ctx)
> + int oldproglen, struct jit_context *ctx,
> + struct shash_desc *hash)
> {
> struct bpf_insn *insn = bpf_prog->insnsi;
> int insn_cnt = bpf_prog->len;
> @@ -360,10 +372,10 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *addrs, u8 *image,
> int proglen = 0;
> u8 *prog = temp;
>
> - emit_prologue(&prog);
> + emit_prologue(&prog, hash);
>
> if (seen_ld_abs)
> - emit_load_skb_data_hlen(&prog);
> + emit_load_skb_data_hlen(&prog, hash);
>
> for (i = 0; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) {
> const s32 imm32 = insn->imm;
> @@ -875,7 +887,7 @@ xadd: if (is_imm8(insn->off))
> if (seen_ld_abs) {
> if (reload_skb_data) {
> EMIT1(0x5F); /* pop %rdi */
> - emit_load_skb_data_hlen(&prog);
> + emit_load_skb_data_hlen(&prog, hash);
> } else {
> EMIT2(0x41, 0x59); /* pop %r9 */
> EMIT2(0x41, 0x5A); /* pop %r10 */
> @@ -884,7 +896,7 @@ xadd: if (is_imm8(insn->off))
> break;
>
> case BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL | BPF_X:
> - emit_bpf_tail_call(&prog);
> + emit_bpf_tail_call(&prog, hash);
> break;
>
> /* cond jump */
> @@ -1085,6 +1097,106 @@ xadd: if (is_imm8(insn->off))
> return proglen;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_EBPF_JIT_HASH_OUTPUT
> +static struct shash_desc *bpf_alloc_hash_desc(void)
> +{
> + struct shash_desc *hash;
> + int sz = sizeof(struct shash_desc) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm);
> +
> + hash = kzalloc(sz, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (hash)
> + hash->tfm = tfm;
> + return hash;
> +}
> +
> +static int init_hash(struct shash_desc **hash, u32 *nonce)
> +{
> + if (!bpf_jit_harden)
> + return 0;
> +
> + *nonce = get_random_int();
> +
> + if (!tfm) {
> + tfm = crypto_alloc_shash("sha256", 0, 0);
> + if (IS_ERR(tfm))
> + return PTR_ERR(tfm);
> + }
> +
> + if (!*hash) {
> + *hash = bpf_alloc_hash_desc();
> + if (!*hash)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + }
> +
> + if (crypto_shash_init(*hash) < 0)
> + return -1;
> +
> + return crypto_shash_update(*hash, (u8 *) nonce, sizeof(*nonce));
> +}
> +
> +static bool check_jit_hash(u8 *buf, u32 len, struct shash_desc *out_d,
> + u32 nonce)
> +{
> + struct shash_desc *check_d;
> + void *out, *check;
> + unsigned int sz;
> + bool match = false;
> +
> + if (!out_d)
> + return 0;
> +
> + BUG_ON(out_d->tfm != tfm);
> +
> + sz = crypto_shash_digestsize(out_d->tfm);
> + out = kzalloc(2 * sz, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!out)
> + return false;
> +
> + if (crypto_shash_final(out_d, out) < 0) {
> + kfree(out);
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> + check_d = bpf_alloc_hash_desc();
> + if (!check_d) {
> + kfree(out);
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> + if (crypto_shash_init(check_d) < 0)
> + goto out;
> +
> + if (crypto_shash_update(check_d, (u8 *) &nonce, sizeof(nonce)) < 0)
> + goto out;
> +
> + if (crypto_shash_update(check_d, buf, len) < 0)
> + goto out;
> +
> + check = out + sz;
> + if (crypto_shash_final(check_d, check) < 0)
> + goto out;
> +
> + if (!memcmp(out, check, sz))
> + match = true;
> +
> +out:
> + kfree(out);
> + kfree(check_d);
> + return match;
> +}
> +#else
> +static int init_hash(struct shash_desc **hash, u32 *nonce)
> +{
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static bool check_jit_hash(u8 *buf, u32 len, struct shash_desc *out_d,
> + u32 nonce)
> +{
> + return true;
> +}
> +#endif
> +
> struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
> {
> struct bpf_binary_header *header = NULL;
> @@ -1096,6 +1208,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
> int *addrs;
> int pass;
> int i;
> + struct shash_desc *hash = NULL;
> + u32 nonce;
>
> if (!bpf_jit_enable)
> return orig_prog;
> @@ -1132,7 +1246,15 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
> * pass to emit the final image
> */
> for (pass = 0; pass < 10 || image; pass++) {
> - proglen = do_jit(prog, addrs, image, oldproglen, &ctx);
> + if (init_hash(&hash, &nonce) < 0) {
> + image = NULL;
> + if (header)
> + bpf_jit_binary_free(header);
> + prog = orig_prog;
> + goto out_addrs;
> + }
> +
> + proglen = do_jit(prog, addrs, image, oldproglen, &ctx, hash);
> if (proglen <= 0) {
> image = NULL;
> if (header)
> @@ -1166,6 +1288,8 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
> if (image) {
> bpf_flush_icache(header, image + proglen);
> bpf_jit_binary_lock_ro(header);
> + if (!check_jit_hash(image, proglen, hash, nonce))
> + BUG();
> prog->bpf_func = (void *)image;
> prog->jited = 1;
> } else {
> @@ -1174,6 +1298,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_prog *prog)
>
> out_addrs:
> kfree(addrs);
> + kfree(hash);
> out:
> if (tmp_blinded)
> bpf_jit_prog_release_other(prog, prog == orig_prog ?
> --
> 2.9.3
>

--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

Next message: NeilBrown: "Re: [RFC PATCH] raid1: reset 'bi_next' before reuse the bio"
Previous message: Kees Cook: "[PATCH v2 1/7] bug: Clarify help text for BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION"
In reply to: Tycho Andersen: "[PATCH] ebpf: verify the output of the JIT"
Next in thread: Tycho Andersen: "Re: [PATCH] ebpf: verify the output of the JIT"
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