Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v9 1/4] syscalls: Verify address limit before returning to user-mode

[Kees Cook]

On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 3:52 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 9:50 AM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> On Tue, May 9, 2017 at 9:03 AM, Christoph Hellwig <hch@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On Tue, May 09, 2017 at 06:02:50AM -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
>>>> On Tue, May 09, 2017 at 06:00:01AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>>> > fs/splice.c has some, ahem, interesting uses that have been the source
>>>> > of nasty exploits in the past.  Converting them to use iov_iter
>>>> > properly would be really, really nice.  Christoph, I don't suppose
>>>> > you'd like to do that?
>>>>
>>>> I can take care of all the fs code including this one.
>>>
>>> I spent the afternoon hacking up where I'd like this to head.  It's
>>> completely untested as of now:
>>>
>>>         http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/vfs.git/shortlog/refs/heads/setfs-elimination
>>
>> Ooooh yes! Nice work.
>>
>> I love this:
>> http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/vfs.git/commitdiff/51e83f50f824ca23f5584c172138e6b7c2ff786d
>> but I wonder what it'll cause out-of-tree code to do. I mean, I'd
>> rather nothing out-of-tree be calling these, but I'd hate 3rd party
>> hacks even more.
>>
>> http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/vfs.git/commitdiff/018e0e9030777121fe87e89d43066691e7366587
>> This accidentally(?) removes the kernel-doc comments.
>>
>> http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/vfs.git/commitdiff/78b62c730254fc39fa888cdbdca08fde6e09a798
>> Could this be made defensive? (Return 0 if ret wraps, for example?) I
>> see what the comment says, but not everyone will read that. :(
>>
>> http://git.infradead.org/users/hch/vfs.git/commitdiff/a106276ca0294be054bc89ce97219933fe543df1
>> Perhaps unconditionally set USER_DS on exit instead of retaining
>> whatever was there?
>
> I don't like silent fixups.  If we want to do this, we should BUG or
> at least WARN, not just change the addr limit.  But I'm also not
> convinced it's indicative of an actual bug here.

Nothing should enter that function with KERNEL_DS set, right?

BUG_ON(get_fs() != USER_DS);
set_fs(KERNEL_DS);
...
set_fs(USER_DS);

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security