[PATCH 4/9] Allow processes to be forked and upcalled into a container

From: David Howells
Date: Mon May 22 2017 - 12:26:02 EST

Allow a single process to be forked directly into a container using a new
syscall:

pid_t pid = fork_into_container(int container_fd);

Further attempts to fork into the container will be rejected.

Kernel upcalls will happen in the context of current's container, using
that containers namespaces.

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@xxxxxxxxxx>
---

arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1
arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1
include/linux/cred.h | 3 +
include/linux/kmod.h | 1
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 +
include/linux/nsproxy.h | 7 ++
include/linux/sched/task.h | 4 +
include/linux/security.h | 5 +
include/linux/syscalls.h | 1
init/main.c | 4 +
kernel/cred.c | 45 ++++++++++++
kernel/fork.c | 117 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
kernel/kmod.c | 13 +++-
kernel/kthread.c | 3 +
kernel/nsproxy.c | 13 +++-
kernel/sys_ni.c | 2 -
security/security.c | 5 +
security/selinux/hooks.c | 3 +
18 files changed, 188 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
index 9ccd0f52f874..0d5a9875ead2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl
@@ -394,3 +394,4 @@
385 i386 fsopen sys_fsopen
386 i386 fsmount sys_fsmount
387 i386 container_create sys_container_create
+388 i386 fork_into_container sys_fork_into_container
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
index dab92591511e..e4005cc579b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl
@@ -342,6 +342,7 @@
333 common fsopen sys_fsopen
334 common fsmount sys_fsmount
335 common container_create sys_container_create
+336 common fork_into_container sys_fork_into_container

#
# x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index b03e7d049a64..834f10962014 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@

struct cred;
struct inode;
+struct container;

/*
* COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -149,7 +150,7 @@ struct cred {

extern void __put_cred(struct cred *);
extern void exit_creds(struct task_struct *);
-extern int copy_creds(struct task_struct *, unsigned long);
+extern int copy_creds(struct task_struct *, unsigned long, struct container *);
extern const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void);
extern struct cred *prepare_creds(void);
diff --git a/include/linux/kmod.h b/include/linux/kmod.h
index c4e441e00db5..7f004a261a1c 100644
--- a/include/linux/kmod.h
+++ b/include/linux/kmod.h
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ struct file;
struct subprocess_info {
struct work_struct work;
struct completion *complete;
+ struct container *container;
const char *path;
char **argv;
char **envp;
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index 7b0d484a6a25..37ac19645cca 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -564,6 +564,7 @@
* Check permission before creating a child process. See the clone(2)
* manual page for definitions of the @clone_flags.
* @clone_flags contains the flags indicating what should be shared.
+ * @container indicates the container the task is being created in (or NULL)
* Return 0 if permission is granted.
* @task_alloc:
* @task task being allocated.
@@ -1535,7 +1536,8 @@ union security_list_options {
int (*file_receive)(struct file *file);
int (*file_open)(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);

- int (*task_create)(unsigned long clone_flags);
+ int (*task_create)(unsigned long clone_flags,
+ struct container *container);
int (*task_alloc)(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
void (*task_free)(struct task_struct *task);
int (*cred_alloc_blank)(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
diff --git a/include/linux/nsproxy.h b/include/linux/nsproxy.h
index ac0d65bef5d0..40478a65ab0a 100644
--- a/include/linux/nsproxy.h
+++ b/include/linux/nsproxy.h
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ struct ipc_namespace;
struct pid_namespace;
struct cgroup_namespace;
struct fs_struct;
+struct container;

/*
* A structure to contain pointers to all per-process
@@ -62,9 +63,13 @@ extern struct nsproxy init_nsproxy;
* * /
* task_unlock(task);
*
+ * 4. Container namespaces are set at container creation and cannot be
+ * changed.
+ *
*/

-int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk);
+int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct container *container);
void exit_task_namespaces(struct task_struct *tsk);
void switch_task_namespaces(struct task_struct *tsk, struct nsproxy *new);
void free_nsproxy(struct nsproxy *ns);
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/task.h b/include/linux/sched/task.h
index a978d7189cfd..025193fd0260 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/task.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/task.h
@@ -70,10 +70,10 @@ extern void do_group_exit(int);
extern void exit_files(struct task_struct *);
extern void exit_itimers(struct signal_struct *);

-extern long _do_fork(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, int __user *, int __user *, unsigned long);
+extern long _do_fork(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, int __user *, int __user *, unsigned long, struct container *);
extern long do_fork(unsigned long, unsigned long, unsigned long, int __user *, int __user *);
struct task_struct *fork_idle(int);
-extern pid_t kernel_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, unsigned long flags);
+extern pid_t kernel_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, unsigned long flags, struct container *);

extern void free_task(struct task_struct *tsk);

diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 01bdf7637ec6..ac8625b72d0e 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ int security_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct fown_struct *fown, int sig);
int security_file_receive(struct file *file);
int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred);
-int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags);
+int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags, struct container *container);
int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags);
void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task);
int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);
@@ -885,7 +885,8 @@ static inline int security_file_open(struct file *file,
return 0;
}

-static inline int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
+static inline int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags,
+ struct container *container)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/syscalls.h b/include/linux/syscalls.h
index 5a0324dd024c..7ca6c287ce84 100644
--- a/include/linux/syscalls.h
+++ b/include/linux/syscalls.h
@@ -911,5 +911,6 @@ asmlinkage long sys_fsmount(int fsfd, int dfd, const char *path, unsigned int at
asmlinkage long sys_container_create(const char __user *name, unsigned int flags,
unsigned long spare3, unsigned long spare4,
unsigned long spare5);
+asmlinkage long sys_fork_into_container(int containerfd);

#endif
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index f866510472d7..f638cb44826a 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -397,9 +397,9 @@ static noinline void __ref rest_init(void)
* the init task will end up wanting to create kthreads, which, if
* we schedule it before we create kthreadd, will OOPS.
*/
- kernel_thread(kernel_init, NULL, CLONE_FS);
+ kernel_thread(kernel_init, NULL, CLONE_FS, NULL);
numa_default_policy();
- pid = kernel_thread(kthreadd, NULL, CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES);
+ pid = kernel_thread(kthreadd, NULL, CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES, NULL);
rcu_read_lock();
kthreadd_task = find_task_by_pid_ns(pid, &init_pid_ns);
rcu_read_unlock();
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 2bc66075740f..363ccd333267 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -312,6 +312,43 @@ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
}

/*
+ * Handle forking a process into a container.
+ */
+static struct cred *copy_container_creds(struct container *container)
+{
+ struct cred *new;
+
+ validate_process_creds();
+
+ new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!new)
+ return NULL;
+
+ kdebug("prepare_creds() alloc %p", new);
+
+ memcpy(new, container->cred, sizeof(struct cred));
+
+ atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+ set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
+ get_group_info(new->group_info);
+ get_uid(new->user);
+ get_user_ns(new->user_ns);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
+ new->security = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (security_prepare_creds(new, container->cred, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
+ goto error;
+ validate_creds(new);
+ return new;
+
+error:
+ abort_creds(new);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
* Copy credentials for the new process created by fork()
*
* We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new
@@ -320,7 +357,8 @@ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
* The new process gets the current process's subjective credentials as its
* objective and subjective credentials
*/
-int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
+int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags,
+ struct container *container)
{
struct cred *new;
int ret;
@@ -341,7 +379,10 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
return 0;
}

- new = prepare_creds();
+ if (container)
+ new = copy_container_creds(container);
+ else
+ new = prepare_creds();
if (!new)
return -ENOMEM;

diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index ff2779426fe9..d185c13820d7 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1241,9 +1241,33 @@ static int copy_mm(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
return retval;
}

-static int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
+static int copy_fs(unsigned long clone_flags, struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct container *container)
{
struct fs_struct *fs = current->fs;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CONTAINERS
+ if (container) {
+ fs = kmem_cache_alloc(fs_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!fs)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ fs->users = 1;
+ fs->in_exec = 0;
+ spin_lock_init(&fs->lock);
+ seqcount_init(&fs->seq);
+ fs->umask = 0022;
+
+ spin_lock(&container->lock);
+ fs->pwd = fs->root = container->root;
+ path_get(&fs->root);
+ path_get(&fs->pwd);
+ spin_unlock(&container->lock);
+ tsk->fs = fs;
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
if (clone_flags & CLONE_FS) {
/* tsk->fs is already what we want */
spin_lock(&fs->lock);
@@ -1521,7 +1545,8 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
struct pid *pid,
int trace,
unsigned long tls,
- int node)
+ int node,
+ struct container *container)
{
int retval;
struct task_struct *p;
@@ -1568,7 +1593,7 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
}

- retval = security_task_create(clone_flags);
+ retval = security_task_create(clone_flags, container);
if (retval)
goto fork_out;

@@ -1594,7 +1619,7 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
}
current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;

- retval = copy_creds(p, clone_flags);
+ retval = copy_creds(p, clone_flags, container);
if (retval < 0)
goto bad_fork_free;

@@ -1713,7 +1738,7 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
retval = copy_files(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_semundo;
- retval = copy_fs(clone_flags, p);
+ retval = copy_fs(clone_flags, p, container);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_files;
retval = copy_sighand(clone_flags, p);
@@ -1725,15 +1750,15 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
retval = copy_mm(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_signal;
- retval = copy_namespaces(clone_flags, p);
+ retval = copy_container(clone_flags, p, container);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_mm;
- retval = copy_container(clone_flags, p, NULL);
+ retval = copy_namespaces(clone_flags, p, container);
if (retval)
- goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;
+ goto bad_fork_cleanup_container;
retval = copy_io(clone_flags, p);
if (retval)
- goto bad_fork_cleanup_container;
+ goto bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces;
retval = copy_thread_tls(clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size, p, tls);
if (retval)
goto bad_fork_cleanup_io;
@@ -1921,10 +1946,10 @@ static __latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
bad_fork_cleanup_io:
if (p->io_context)
exit_io_context(p);
-bad_fork_cleanup_container:
- exit_container(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_namespaces:
exit_task_namespaces(p);
+bad_fork_cleanup_container:
+ exit_container(p);
bad_fork_cleanup_mm:
if (p->mm)
mmput(p->mm);
@@ -1976,7 +2001,7 @@ struct task_struct *fork_idle(int cpu)
{
struct task_struct *task;
task = copy_process(CLONE_VM, 0, 0, NULL, &init_struct_pid, 0, 0,
- cpu_to_node(cpu));
+ cpu_to_node(cpu), NULL);
if (!IS_ERR(task)) {
init_idle_pids(task->pids);
init_idle(task, cpu);
@@ -1988,15 +2013,16 @@ struct task_struct *fork_idle(int cpu)
/*
* Ok, this is the main fork-routine.
*
- * It copies the process, and if successful kick-starts
- * it and waits for it to finish using the VM if required.
+ * It copies the process into the specified container, and if successful
+ * kick-starts it and waits for it to finish using the VM if required.
*/
long _do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
unsigned long stack_start,
unsigned long stack_size,
int __user *parent_tidptr,
int __user *child_tidptr,
- unsigned long tls)
+ unsigned long tls,
+ struct container *container)
{
struct task_struct *p;
int trace = 0;
@@ -2020,8 +2046,32 @@ long _do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
trace = 0;
}

+ if (container) {
+ /* A process spawned into a container doesn't share anything
+ * with the parent other than namespaces.
+ */
+ if (clone_flags & (CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID |
+ CLONE_CHILD_SETTID |
+ CLONE_FILES |
+ CLONE_FS |
+ CLONE_IO |
+ CLONE_PARENT |
+ CLONE_PARENT_SETTID |
+ CLONE_PTRACE |
+ CLONE_SETTLS |
+ CLONE_SIGHAND |
+ CLONE_SYSVSEM |
+ CLONE_THREAD))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* However, we do have to let kernel threads borrow a VM. */
+ if ((clone_flags & CLONE_VM) && current->mm)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
p = copy_process(clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size,
- child_tidptr, NULL, trace, tls, NUMA_NO_NODE);
+ child_tidptr, NULL, trace, tls, NUMA_NO_NODE,
+ container);
add_latent_entropy();
/*
* Do this prior waking up the new thread - the thread pointer
@@ -2073,24 +2123,25 @@ long do_fork(unsigned long clone_flags,
int __user *child_tidptr)
{
return _do_fork(clone_flags, stack_start, stack_size,
- parent_tidptr, child_tidptr, 0);
+ parent_tidptr, child_tidptr, 0, NULL);
}
#endif

/*
* Create a kernel thread.
*/
-pid_t kernel_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, unsigned long flags)
+pid_t kernel_thread(int (*fn)(void *), void *arg, unsigned long flags,
+ struct container *container)
{
return _do_fork(flags|CLONE_VM|CLONE_UNTRACED, (unsigned long)fn,
- (unsigned long)arg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ (unsigned long)arg, NULL, NULL, 0, container);
}

#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_FORK
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(fork)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_MMU
- return _do_fork(SIGCHLD, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ return _do_fork(SIGCHLD, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
#else
/* can not support in nommu mode */
return -EINVAL;
@@ -2102,10 +2153,31 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE0(fork)
SYSCALL_DEFINE0(vfork)
{
return _do_fork(CLONE_VFORK | CLONE_VM | SIGCHLD, 0,
- 0, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ 0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
}
#endif

+SYSCALL_DEFINE1(fork_into_container, int, containerfd)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_CONTAINERS
+ struct fd f = fdget(containerfd);
+ int ret;
+
+ if (!f.file)
+ return -EBADF;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ if (is_container_file(f.file)) {
+ struct container *c = f.file->private_data;
+
+ ret = _do_fork(SIGCHLD, 0, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, c);
+ }
+ fdput(f);
+ return ret;
+#else
+ return -ENOSYS;
+#endif
+}
+
#ifdef __ARCH_WANT_SYS_CLONE
#ifdef CONFIG_CLONE_BACKWARDS
SYSCALL_DEFINE5(clone, unsigned long, clone_flags, unsigned long, newsp,
@@ -2130,7 +2202,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(clone, unsigned long, clone_flags, unsigned long, newsp,
unsigned long, tls)
#endif
{
- return _do_fork(clone_flags, newsp, 0, parent_tidptr, child_tidptr, tls);
+ return _do_fork(clone_flags, newsp, 0, parent_tidptr, child_tidptr, tls,
+ NULL);
}
#endif

diff --git a/kernel/kmod.c b/kernel/kmod.c
index 563f97e2be36..1857a3bb9e61 100644
--- a/kernel/kmod.c
+++ b/kernel/kmod.c
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
#include <linux/async.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/container.h>

#include <trace/events/module.h>

@@ -160,7 +161,7 @@ int __request_module(bool wait, const char *fmt, ...)
* would be to run the parents of this process, counting how many times
* kmod was invoked. That would mean accessing the internals of the
* process tables to get the command line, proc_pid_cmdline is static
- * and it is not worth changing the proc code just to handle this case.
+ * and it is not worth changing the proc code just to handle this case.
* KAO.
*
* "trace the ppid" is simple, but will fail if someone's
@@ -194,6 +195,7 @@ static void call_usermodehelper_freeinfo(struct subprocess_info *info)
{
if (info->cleanup)
(*info->cleanup)(info);
+ put_container(info->container);
kfree(info);
}

@@ -274,7 +276,8 @@ static void call_usermodehelper_exec_sync(struct subprocess_info *sub_info)

/* If SIGCLD is ignored sys_wait4 won't populate the status. */
kernel_sigaction(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
- pid = kernel_thread(call_usermodehelper_exec_async, sub_info, SIGCHLD);
+ pid = kernel_thread(call_usermodehelper_exec_async, sub_info, SIGCHLD,
+ sub_info->container);
if (pid < 0) {
sub_info->retval = pid;
} else {
@@ -335,7 +338,7 @@ static void call_usermodehelper_exec_work(struct work_struct *work)
* that always ignores SIGCHLD to ensure auto-reaping.
*/
pid = kernel_thread(call_usermodehelper_exec_async, sub_info,
- CLONE_PARENT | SIGCHLD);
+ CLONE_PARENT | SIGCHLD, sub_info->container);
if (pid < 0) {
sub_info->retval = pid;
umh_complete(sub_info);
@@ -531,6 +534,8 @@ struct subprocess_info *call_usermodehelper_setup(const char *path, char **argv,

INIT_WORK(&sub_info->work, call_usermodehelper_exec_work);

+ sub_info->container = current->container;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
sub_info->path = CONFIG_STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH;
#else
@@ -564,6 +569,8 @@ int call_usermodehelper_exec(struct subprocess_info *sub_info, int wait)
DECLARE_COMPLETION_ONSTACK(done);
int retval = 0;

+ get_container(sub_info->container);
+
if (!sub_info->path) {
call_usermodehelper_freeinfo(sub_info);
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/kernel/kthread.c b/kernel/kthread.c
index 26db528c1d88..ca0090f90645 100644
--- a/kernel/kthread.c
+++ b/kernel/kthread.c
@@ -251,7 +251,8 @@ static void create_kthread(struct kthread_create_info *create)
current->pref_node_fork = create->node;
#endif
/* We want our own signal handler (we take no signals by default). */
- pid = kernel_thread(kthread, create, CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES | SIGCHLD);
+ pid = kernel_thread(kthread, create, CLONE_FS | CLONE_FILES | SIGCHLD,
+ NULL);
if (pid < 0) {
/* If user was SIGKILLed, I release the structure. */
struct completion *done = xchg(&create->done, NULL);
diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c
index 4bb5184b3a80..9743cf23df93 100644
--- a/kernel/nsproxy.c
+++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c
@@ -136,12 +136,19 @@ struct nsproxy *create_new_namespaces(unsigned long flags,
* called from clone. This now handles copy for nsproxy and all
* namespaces therein.
*/
-int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
+int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct container *container)
{
struct nsproxy *old_ns = tsk->nsproxy;
struct user_namespace *user_ns = task_cred_xxx(tsk, user_ns);
struct nsproxy *new_ns;

+ if (container) {
+ get_nsproxy(container->ns);
+ tsk->nsproxy = container->ns;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
if (likely(!(flags & (CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS | CLONE_NEWIPC |
CLONE_NEWPID | CLONE_NEWNET |
CLONE_NEWCGROUP)))) {
@@ -151,7 +158,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)

if (!ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
-
+
/*
* CLONE_NEWIPC must detach from the undolist: after switching
* to a new ipc namespace, the semaphore arrays from the old
@@ -163,7 +170,7 @@ int copy_namespaces(unsigned long flags, struct task_struct *tsk)
(CLONE_NEWIPC | CLONE_SYSVSEM))
return -EINVAL;

- new_ns = create_new_namespaces(flags, tsk->nsproxy, user_ns, tsk->fs);
+ new_ns = create_new_namespaces(flags, old_ns, user_ns, tsk->fs);
if (IS_ERR(new_ns))
return PTR_ERR(new_ns);

diff --git a/kernel/sys_ni.c b/kernel/sys_ni.c
index 99b1e1f58d05..b685ffe3591f 100644
--- a/kernel/sys_ni.c
+++ b/kernel/sys_ni.c
@@ -265,4 +265,4 @@ cond_syscall(sys_fsmount);

/* Containers */
cond_syscall(sys_container_create);
-
+cond_syscall(sys_fork_into_container);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index b5c5b5ae1266..21e14aa26cd3 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -961,9 +961,10 @@ int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
return fsnotify_perm(file, MAY_OPEN);
}

-int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
+int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags,
+ struct container *container)
{
- return call_int_hook(task_create, 0, clone_flags);
+ return call_int_hook(task_create, 0, clone_flags, container);
}

int security_task_alloc(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long clone_flags)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 877b7e7bd2d5..23bdbb0c2de5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3865,7 +3865,8 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)

/* task security operations */

-static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
+static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags,
+ struct container *container)
{
u32 sid = current_sid();