[PATCH 4.11 160/197] metag/uaccess: Check access_ok in strncpy_from_user

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.11-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: James Hogan <james.hogan@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit 3a158a62da0673db918b53ac1440845a5b64fd90 upstream.

The metag implementation of strncpy_from_user() doesn't validate the src
pointer, which could allow reading of arbitrary kernel memory. Add a
short access_ok() check to prevent that.

Its still possible for it to read across the user/kernel boundary, but
it will invariably reach a NUL character after only 9 bytes, leaking
only a static kernel address being loaded into D0Re0 at the beginning of
__start, which is acceptable for the immediate fix.

Reported-by: Al Viro <viro@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: James Hogan <james.hogan@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: linux-metag@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
 arch/metag/include/asm/uaccess.h |    9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/metag/include/asm/uaccess.h
+++ b/arch/metag/include/asm/uaccess.h
@@ -194,8 +194,13 @@ do {
 extern long __must_check __strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src,
 					     long count);
 
-#define strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count) __strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count)
-
+static inline long
+strncpy_from_user(char *dst, const char __user *src, long count)
+{
+	if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, src, 1))
+		return -EFAULT;
+	return __strncpy_from_user(dst, src, count);
+}
 /*
  * Return the size of a string (including the ending 0)
  *