On Fri, 2017-05-05 at 16:21 +0200, Roberto Sassu wrote:
pcrlock() has been modified to pass the correct arguments
to tpm_pcr_extend(): the pointer of a tpm2_digest structure containing
a random value generated by tpm_get_random() and the size of the array (1).
If the number of arguments is wrong, that means the patch that
introduced the change is not bi-sect safe. (This comment is
applicable to patch 5/5 too.)
Mimi
Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@xxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/keys/trusted.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c
index 2ae31c5..3eb89e6 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted.c
@@ -377,15 +377,15 @@ static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd,
*/
static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum)
{
- unsigned char hash[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ struct tpm2_digest digestarg = {.alg_id = TPM2_ALG_SHA1};
int ret;
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
- ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, digestarg.digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE)
return ret;
- return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0;
+ return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, 1, &digestarg) ? -EINVAL : 0;
}
/*