Re: [PATCH v5 0/3] Implement fast refcount overflow protection

[Davidlohr Bueso]

On Tue, 30 May 2017, Kees Cook wrote:

> A new patch has been added at the start of this series to make the default
> refcount_t implementation just use an unchecked atomic_t implementation,
> since many kernel subsystems want to be able to opt out of the full
> validation, since it includes a small performance overhead. When enabling
> CONFIG_REFCOUNT_FULL, the full validation is used.
>
> The other two patches provide overflow protection on x86 without incurring
> a performance penalty. The changelog for patch 3 is reproduced here for
> details:

To be sure I'm getting this right, after this all archs with the exception
of x86 will use the regular atomic_t ("unsecure") flavor, right?

Thanks,
Davidlohr