Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v7 2/2] security: tty: make TIOCSTI ioctl require CAP_SYS_ADMIN

[Matt Brown]

On 6/2/17 2:18 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Matt Brown (matt@xxxxxxxxx):
>> On 6/2/17 12:57 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> I'm not quite sure what you're asking for here.  Let me offer a precise
>>> strawman design.  I'm sure there are problems with it, it's just a starting
>>> point.
>>>
>>> system-wide whitelist (for now 'may_push_chars') is full by default.
>>>
>>
>> So is may_push_chars just an alias for TIOCSTI? Or are there some
>> potential whitelist members that would map to multiple ioctls?
> 
> <shrug>  I'm seeing it as only TIOCSTI right now.
> 
>>> By default, nothing changes - you can use those on your own tty, need
>>> CAP_SYS_ADMIN against init_user_ns otherwise.
>>>
>>> Introduce a new CAP_TTY_PRIVILEGED.
>>>
>>
>> I'm fine with this.
>>
>>> When may_push_chars is removed from the whitelist, you lose the ability
>>> to use TIOCSTI on a tty - even your own - if you do not have CAP_TTY_PRIVILEGED
>>> against the tty's user_ns.
>>>
>>
>> How do you propose storing/updating the whitelist? sysctl?
>>
>> If it is a sysctl, would each whitelist member have a sysctl?
>> e.g.: kernel.ioctlwhitelist.may_push_chars = 1
>>
>> Overall, I'm fine with this idea.
> 
> That sounds reasonable.  Or a securityfs file - I guess not everyone
> has securityfs, but if it were to become part of YAMA then that would
> work.
> 

Yama doesn't depend on securityfs does it?

What do other people think? Should this be an addition to YAMA or its
own thing?

Alan Cox: what do you think of the above ioctl whitelisting scheme?