Re: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v1 1/1] Add Trusted Path Execution as a stackable LSM

[Matt Brown]

On 06/04/2017 01:47 AM, Eric Biggers wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 04, 2017 at 01:24:13AM -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
> > On 06/03/2017 02:33 AM, Al Viro wrote:
> > > On Sat, Jun 03, 2017 at 01:53:51AM -0400, Matt Brown wrote:
> > >
> > > > +static int tpe_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> > > > +{
> > > > +	struct file *file = bprm->file;
> > > > +	struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry->d_parent);
> > > > +	struct inode *file_inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
> > >
> > > Bloody wonderful.  Do tell, what *does* prevent a race with rename(2) here,
> > > somehow making sure that your 'inode' won't get freed right under you?
> >
> > Good catch. How does this look:
> >
> > spin_lock(&inode->i_lock);
> > spin_lock(&file_inode->i_lock);
> > if (global_nonroot(inode->i_uid) && !uid_eq(inode->i_uid, cred->uid))
> > 	reason1 = "directory not owned by user";
> > else if (inode->i_mode & 0002)
> > 	reason1 = "file in world-writable directory";
> > else if ((inode->i_mode & 0020) && global_nonroot_gid(inode->i_gid))
> > 	reason1 = "file in group-writable directory";
> > else if (file_inode->i_mode & 0002)
> > 	reason1 = "file is world-writable";
> > spin_unlock(&inode->i_lock);
> > spin_unlock(&file_inode->i_lock);
> >
> > and likewise for other places in the code?
>
> No, it needs to take a reference on the parent dentry before using it, using
> dget_parent(), I think, and then dropping it later with dput().  Taking i_lock
> isn't needed.
>
> Eric

Got it. Thank you!

Matt Brown