Re: [PATCH 0/7] CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE

[Kees Cook]

On Mon, Jun 19, 2017 at 2:50 PM, Andrew Morton
<akpm@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Mon, 19 Jun 2017 13:26:20 -0700 Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>
>> Here are the outstanding fixes for CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE, along with Daniel's
>> v5 patch and a tweak from me to add CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE to avoid
>> failing the build on architectures that have not hunted down all the needed
>> fixes yet.
>>
>> This was in my for-next/kspp tree, but since it depends on fixes in other
>> trees, the preference is for these to all get carried in -mm instead of
>> in KSPP.
>
> All the patches you sent are already in -next (from the kspp tree?) so
> I can't use them.

Err... that's what you asked me to send? And I had removed them from
kspp so you could carry them.

>> The extra needed fixes in -next are:
>>
>>         scsi: csiostor: Avoid content leaks and casts
>>         arm64, vdso: Define vdso_{start,end} as array
>>         staging/rts5208: Fix read overflow in memcpy
>>         libertas: Avoid reading past end of buffer
>>         ray_cs: Avoid reading past end of buffer
>
> These didn't get sent out?

These are all already in -next from other non-kspp trees. I was just
trying to be complete about showing where all the needed fixes were.

> If the kspp tree is already in -next then how about leaving things that
> way, and send Linus a pull request for -rc1?

*sob* I'm happy to do that. I just want you and sfr to agree. :P If I
carry them in my kspp tree, it'll depend on -next (which I'm fine
with, but sfr does not like).

I can add it all back to kspp, just let me what you both can agree on. :P

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security