Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/xen: allow userspace access during hypercalls

['Marek Marczykowski-GÃrecki']

On Mon, Jun 26, 2017 at 01:09:58PM +0000, Paul Durrant wrote:
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Xen-devel [mailto:xen-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of
> > Marek Marczykowski-GÃrecki
> > Sent: 26 June 2017 13:45
> > To: Juergen Groà <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
> > Cc: Andrew Cooper <Andrew.Cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>; x86@xxxxxxxxxx; linux-
> > kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; xen-
> > devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx; Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>
> > Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/xen: allow userspace access during
> > hypercalls
> > 
> > On Mon, Jun 26, 2017 at 02:05:48PM +0200, Juergen Groà wrote:
> > > On 06/23/2017 02:47 PM, Marek Marczykowski-GÃrecki wrote:
> > > > Userspace application can do a hypercall through /dev/xen/privcmd, and
> > > > some for some hypercalls argument is a pointers to user-provided
> > > > structure. When SMAP is supported and enabled, hypervisor can't access.
> > > > So, lets allow it.
> > >
> > > What about HYPERVISOR_dm_op?
> > 
> > Indeed, arguments copied to kernel space there are only addresses of
> > buffers. Will send v2 in a moment.
> > But I can't test it right now, as for my understanding this require
> > HVM/PVHv2 dom0 or stubdomain...
> > 
> 
> No, you don't need anything particularly special to use dm_op. Just up-to-date xen, privcmd, and QEMU. QEMU should end up using dm_op by default if all three are in place.

But the issue this patch fixes applies only to hypercalls issued from HVM.

-- 
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-GÃrecki
Invisible Things Lab
A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text.
Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing?

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