Re: [PATCH v2 0/2] mm,fork,security: introduce MADV_WIPEONFORK

[Michal Hocko]

On Tue 08-08-17 14:45:14, Rik van Riel wrote:
> On Tue, 2017-08-08 at 09:52 -0700, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > On Tue, Aug 08, 2017 at 11:46:08AM -0400, Rik van Riel wrote:
> > > On Tue, 2017-08-08 at 08:19 -0700, Mike Kravetz wrote:
> > > > If the use case is fairly specific, then perhaps it makes sense
> > > > to
> > > > make MADV_WIPEONFORK not applicable (EINVAL) for mappings where
> > > > the
> > > > result is 'questionable'.
> > > 
> > > That would be a question for Florian and Colm.
> > > 
> > > If they are OK with MADV_WIPEONFORK only working on
> > > anonymous VMAs (no file mapping), that certainly could
> > > be implemented.
> > > 
> > > On the other hand, I am not sure that introducing cases
> > > where MADV_WIPEONFORK does not implement wipe-on-fork
> > > semantics would reduce user confusion...
> > 
> > It'll simply do exactly what it does today, so it won't introduce any
> > new fallback code.
> 
> Sure, but actually implementing MADV_WIPEONFORK in a
> way that turns file mapped VMAs into zero page backed
> anonymous VMAs after fork takes no more code than
> implementing it in a way that refuses to work on VMAs
> that have a file backing.
> 
> There is no complexity argument for or against either
> approach.
> 
> The big question is, what is the best for users?
> 
> Should we return -EINVAL when MADV_WIPEONFORK is called
> on a VMA that has a file backing, and only succeed on
> anonymous VMAs?

I would rather be conservative and implement the bare minimum until
there is a reasonable usecase to demand the feature for shared mappings
as well.
-- 
Michal Hocko
SUSE Labs