Re: tip -ENOBOOT - bisected to locking/refcounts, x86/asm: Implement fast refcount overflow protection
From: Kees Cook
Date: Thu Aug 31 2017 - 13:01:06 EST
On Thu, Aug 31, 2017 at 6:58 AM, Mike Galbraith <efault@xxxxxx> wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-08-30 at 21:10 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Wed, Aug 30, 2017 at 9:01 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> > On Wed, Aug 30, 2017 at 8:12 PM, Mike Galbraith <efault@xxxxxx> wrote:
>> >> On Wed, 2017-08-30 at 19:27 -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> >>
>> >>> Interesting! Can you try with 633547973ffc3 ("net: convert
>> >>> sk_buff.users from atomic_t to refcount_t") reverted? I'll see if
>> >>> running haveged will help me trigger this on my system...
>> >>
>> >> With that (plus 230cd1279d001 fix to it) reverted, vbox boots.
>> >
>> > Wonderful! Thank you so much for helping track this down.
>> >
>> > So, it seems that sk_buff.users will need some more special attention
>> > before we can convert it to refcount.
>> >
>> > x86-refcount will saturate with refcount_dec_and_test() if the result
>> > is negative. But that would mean at least starting at 0. FULL should
>> > have WARNed in this case, so I remain slightly confused why it was
>> > missed by FULL.
>>
>> Actually, if this is a race condition it's possible that FULL is slow
>> enough to miss it...
>>
>> I bet something briefly takes the refcount negative, and with
>> unchecked atomics, it come back up positive again during the race.
>> FULL may miss the race, and x86-refcount will catch it and saturate...
>
> (gdb) list *in6_dev_get+0x1e
> 0xffffffff8166d3de is in in6_dev_get (./arch/x86/include/asm/refcount.h:52).
> 47 : "cc", "cx");
> 48 }
> 49
> 50 static __always_inline void refcount_inc(refcount_t *r)
> 51 {
> 52 asm volatile(LOCK_PREFIX "incl %0\n\t"
> 53 REFCOUNT_CHECK_LT_ZERO
> 54 : [counter] "+m" (r->refs.counter)
> 55 : : "cc", "cx");
> 56
>
> gdb) list *in6_dev_get+0x10
> 0xffffffff8166d3d0 is in in6_dev_get (./include/net/addrconf.h:318).
> 313 {
> 314 struct inet6_dev *idev;
> 315
> 316 rcu_read_lock();
> 317 idev = rcu_dereference(dev->ip6_ptr);
> 318 if (idev)
> 319 refcount_inc(&idev->refcnt);
> 320 rcu_read_unlock();
> 321 return idev;
> 322
>
> That's from kernel with no revert, but your silent saturation patch
> still applied, AND built with gcc-6.3.1. Kernel traps, but it boots
> and works, as does kernel built with gcc-7.0.1. Remove your silent
> saturation patch, kernel doesn't notice a thing, just works.
>
> With gcc-4.8.5, trap means you're as good as dead, with the other two,
> trap means the intended. Compiler, constraints, dark elves.. pick one.
Oh! So it's gcc-version sensitive? That's alarming. Is this mapping correct:
4.8.5: WARN, eventual kernel hang
6.3.1, 7.0.1: WARN, but continues working
> Full first splat from bootable gcc-6.3.1 built kernel.
>
> [ 1.293962] NET: Registered protocol family 10
> [ 1.294635] refcount_t silent saturation at in6_dev_get+0x25/0x104 in swapper/0[1], uid/euid: 0/0
That's an _increment_ saturation? Which means the result must be
negative, so it started from least -2.
> [ 1.295616] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [ 1.296120] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/panic.c:612 refcount_error_report+0x94/0x9e
> [ 1.296950] Modules linked in:
> [ 1.297276] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.13.0.g152d54a-tip-default #53
> [ 1.299179] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.0.0-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014
> [ 1.300743] task: ffff88013ab84040 task.stack: ffffc9000062c000
> [ 1.301825] RIP: 0010:refcount_error_report+0x94/0x9e
> [ 1.302804] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000062fc10 EFLAGS: 00010282
> [ 1.303791] RAX: 0000000000000055 RBX: ffffffff81a34274 RCX: ffffffff81c605e8
> [ 1.304991] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000096 RDI: 0000000000000246
> [ 1.306189] RBP: ffffc9000062fd58 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000175
> [ 1.307392] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88013ab84040
> [ 1.308583] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: ffffffff81a256c8
> [ 1.309768] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88013fc00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> [ 1.311052] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> [ 1.312100] CR2: 00007f4631fe8df0 CR3: 0000000137d09003 CR4: 00000000001606f0
> [ 1.313301] Call Trace:
> [ 1.314012] ex_handler_refcount+0x63/0x70
> [ 1.314893] fixup_exception+0x32/0x40
> [ 1.315737] do_trap+0x8c/0x170
> [ 1.316519] do_error_trap+0x70/0xd0
> [ 1.317340] ? in6_dev_get+0x23/0x104
> [ 1.318172] ? netlink_broadcast_filtered+0x2bd/0x430
> [ 1.319156] ? kmem_cache_alloc_trace+0xce/0x5d0
> [ 1.320098] ? set_debug_rodata+0x11/0x11
> [ 1.320964] invalid_op+0x1e/0x30
> [ 1.322520] RIP: 0010:in6_dev_get+0x25/0x104
> [ 1.323631] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000062fe00 EFLAGS: 00010202
> [ 1.324614] RAX: ffff880137de2400 RBX: ffff880137df4600 RCX: ffff880137de24f0
> [ 1.325793] RDX: ffff88013a5e4000 RSI: 00000000fffffe00 RDI: ffff88013a5e4000
> [ 1.326964] RBP: 00000000000000d1 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff880137de7600
> [ 1.328150] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8801398a4df8 R12: 0000000000000000
> [ 1.329374] R13: ffffffff82137872 R14: 014200ca00000000 R15: 0000000000000000
> [ 1.330547] ? set_debug_rodata+0x11/0x11
> [ 1.331392] ip6_route_init_special_entries+0x2a/0x89
> [ 1.332369] addrconf_init+0x9e/0x203
> [ 1.333173] inet6_init+0x1af/0x365
> [ 1.333956] ? af_unix_init+0x4e/0x4e
> [ 1.334753] do_one_initcall+0x4e/0x190
> [ 1.335555] ? set_debug_rodata+0x11/0x11
> [ 1.336369] kernel_init_freeable+0x189/0x20e
> [ 1.337230] ? rest_init+0xd0/0xd0
> [ 1.337999] kernel_init+0xa/0xf7
> [ 1.338744] ret_from_fork+0x25/0x30
> [ 1.339500] Code: 48 8b 95 80 00 00 00 41 55 49 8d 8c 24 f0 0a 00 00 45 8b 84 24 10 09 00 00 41 89 c1 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 60 7a a3 81 e8 07 de 05 00 <0f> ff 58 5b 5d 41 5c 41 5d c3 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 56
> [ 1.342243] ---[ end trace b5d40c0fccce776c ]---
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Pixel Security