Re: [RFC Part2 PATCH v3 16/26] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA command
From: Borislav Petkov
Date: Wed Sep 13 2017 - 13:55:59 EST
On Mon, Jul 24, 2017 at 03:02:53PM -0500, Brijesh Singh wrote:
> The command is used for encrypting the guest memory region using the VM
> encryption key (VEK) created during LAUNCH_START.
Yap, this is one good commit message!
:-)
> Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@xxxxxxx>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 165 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index 3e325578..91b070f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@
> #include <linux/frame.h>
> #include <linux/psp-sev.h>
> #include <linux/file.h>
> +#include <linux/pagemap.h>
> +#include <linux/swap.h>
>
> #include <asm/apic.h>
> #include <asm/perf_event.h>
> @@ -331,6 +333,7 @@ static int sev_asid_new(void);
> static void sev_asid_free(int asid);
> static void sev_deactivate_handle(struct kvm *kvm, int *error);
> static void sev_decommission_handle(struct kvm *kvm, int *error);
> +#define __sme_page_pa(x) __sme_set(page_to_pfn(x) << PAGE_SHIFT)
>
> static bool svm_sev_enabled(void)
> {
> @@ -5796,6 +5799,164 @@ static int sev_launch_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> return ret;
> }
>
> +static struct page **sev_pin_memory(unsigned long uaddr, unsigned long ulen,
> + unsigned long *n, int write)
> +{
> + unsigned long npages, pinned, size;
> + struct page **pages;
> + int first, last;
> +
> + /* Get number of pages */
> + first = (uaddr & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + last = ((uaddr + ulen - 1) & PAGE_MASK) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
> + npages = (last - first + 1);
> +
> + /* Avoid using vmalloc for smaller buffer */
> + size = npages * sizeof(struct page *);
> + if (size > PAGE_SIZE)
> + pages = vmalloc(size);
> + else
> + pages = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
> +
> + if (!pages)
> + return NULL;
> +
> + /* pin the user virtual address */
> + pinned = get_user_pages_fast(uaddr, npages, write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0,
> + pages);
Let it stick out.
> + if (pinned != npages) {
> + pr_err("failed to pin %ld pages (got %ld)\n", npages, pinned);
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> + *n = npages;
> + return pages;
> +err:
> + if (pinned > 0)
> + release_pages(pages, pinned, 0);
<---- newline here.
> + kvfree(pages);
> +
> + return NULL;
> +}
> +
> +static void sev_unpin_memory(struct page **pages, unsigned long npages)
> +{
> + release_pages(pages, npages, 0);
> + kvfree(pages);
> +}
> +
> +static void sev_clflush_pages(struct page *pages[], unsigned long npages)
> +{
> + uint8_t *page_virtual;
> + unsigned long i;
> +
> + if (npages == 0 || pages == NULL)
> + return;
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < npages; i++) {
> + page_virtual = kmap_atomic(pages[i]);
> + clflush_cache_range(page_virtual, PAGE_SIZE);
> + kunmap_atomic(page_virtual);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static int get_num_contig_pages(int idx, struct page **inpages,
> + unsigned long npages)
> +{
> + int i = idx + 1, pages = 1;
> + unsigned long paddr, next_paddr;
> +
> + /* find the number of contiguous pages starting from idx */
> + paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[idx]);
> + while (i < npages) {
> + next_paddr = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i++]);
> + if ((paddr + PAGE_SIZE) == next_paddr) {
> + pages++;
> + paddr = next_paddr;
> + continue;
> + }
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + return pages;
> +}
> +
> +static int sev_launch_update_data(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
> +{
> + unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end, next_vaddr, npages, size;
> + struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data params;
> + struct sev_data_launch_update_data *data;
> + struct page **inpages;
> + int i, ret, pages;
> +
> + if (!sev_guest(kvm))
> + return -ENOTTY;
> +
> + if (copy_from_user(¶ms, (void *)argp->data,
> + sizeof(struct kvm_sev_launch_update_data)))
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (!data)
> + return -ENOMEM;
Same issues as before.
> +
> + vaddr = params.address;
> + size = params.length;
> + vaddr_end = vaddr + size;
> +
> + /* lock the user memory */
> + inpages = sev_pin_memory(vaddr, size, &npages, 1);
This way user basically controls how many pages to pin and you need to
limit that on the upper end.
> + if (!inpages) {
> + ret = -ENOMEM;
> + goto e_free;
> + }
> +
> + /*
> + * invalidate the cache to ensure that DRAM has recent content before
recent content?
> + * calling the SEV commands.
> + */
> + sev_clflush_pages(inpages, npages);
> +
> + for (i = 0; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr = next_vaddr, i += pages) {
> + int offset, len;
> +
> + /*
> + * since user buffer may not be page aligned, calculate the
> + * offset within the page.
> + */
> + offset = vaddr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1);
> +
> + /*
> + * calculate the number of pages that can be encrypted in one go
> + */
> + pages = get_num_contig_pages(i, inpages, npages);
> +
> + len = min_t(size_t, ((pages * PAGE_SIZE) - offset), size);
> +
> + data->handle = sev_get_handle(kvm);
> + data->length = len;
> + data->address = __sme_page_pa(inpages[i]) + offset;
> + ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA, data,
> + &argp->error);
Yah, let it stick out.
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
SUSE Linux GmbH, GF: Felix ImendÃrffer, Jane Smithard, Graham Norton, HRB 21284 (AG NÃrnberg)
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