Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH] fs: Use CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE to allow for file dedupe
From: Nick Kralevich
Date: Sat Oct 21 2017 - 10:08:46 EST
On Sat, Oct 21, 2017 at 6:28 AM, Nicolas Belouin <nicolas@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> In its current implementation the check is against CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
> however this capability is bloated and inapropriate for this use.
> Indeed the check aims to avoid dedupe against non writable files,
> falling directly in the use case of CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE.
>
> Signed-off-by: Nicolas Belouin <nicolas@xxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> fs/read_write.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/read_write.c b/fs/read_write.c
> index f0d4b16873e8..43cc7e84e29e 100644
> --- a/fs/read_write.c
> +++ b/fs/read_write.c
> @@ -1965,7 +1965,7 @@ int vfs_dedupe_file_range(struct file *file, struct file_dedupe_range *same)
> u64 len;
> int i;
> int ret;
> - bool is_admin = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> + bool is_admin = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE);
Can you please reverse the order of the checks? In particular, on an
SELinux based system, a capable() call generates an SELinux denial,
and people often instinctively allow the first operation performed.
Reordering the elements will ensure that the CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE denial
(least permissive) is generated first.
> u16 count = same->dest_count;
> struct file *dst_file;
> loff_t dst_off;
> --
> 2.14.2
>
--
Nick Kralevich | Android Security | nnk@xxxxxxxxxx | 650.214.4037