[PATCH] perf/x86/intel/bts: Fix exclusive event reference leak

[Alexander Shishkin]

Commit

d2878d642a4ed ("perf/x86/intel/bts: Disallow use by unprivileged users on paranoid systems")

adds a privilege check in the exactly wrong place in the event init path:
after the 'LBR exclusive' reference has been taken, and doesn't release it
in the case of insuffucient privileges. After this, nobody in the system
gets to use PT or LBR afterwards.

This patch moves the privilege check to where it should have been in the
first place.

Signed-off-by: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Fixes: d2878d642a4ed ("perf/x86/intel/bts: Disallow use by unprivileged users on paranoid systems")
---
 arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
index ce1dac7115c9..91bbf0a3f27e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
+++ b/arch/x86/events/intel/bts.c
@@ -555,9 +555,6 @@ static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	if (event->attr.type != bts_pmu.type)
 		return -ENOENT;
 
-	if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts))
-		return -EBUSY;
-
 	/*
 	 * BTS leaks kernel addresses even when CPL0 tracing is
 	 * disabled, so disallow intel_bts driver for unprivileged
@@ -571,6 +568,9 @@ static int bts_event_init(struct perf_event *event)
 	    !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
 		return -EACCES;
 
+	if (x86_add_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts))
+		return -EBUSY;
+
 	ret = x86_reserve_hardware();
 	if (ret) {
 		x86_del_exclusive(x86_lbr_exclusive_bts);
-- 
2.14.2