Re: [RFC] Retpoline: Binary mitigation for branch-target-injection (aka "Spectre")

[David Woodhouse]

On Thu, 2018-01-04 at 08:18 -0800, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> I hate to say this, but I think Intel should postpone CET until the
> dust settles.

CET isn't a *problem* for retpoline. We've had a CET-compatible version
for a while now, and I posted it earlier. It's just that Andi was
working from an older version of my patches.

Of course, there's a school of thought that says that Intel should
postpone *everything* until this is all fixed sanely, but there's
nothing special about CET in that respect.

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