Re: [PATCH 6/7] x86/svm: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU

[Jim Mattson]

Before VM-entry, don't we need to flush the BHB and the RSB to avoid
revealing KASLR information to the guest? (Thanks to Liran for
pointing this out.)

On Tue, Jan 9, 2018 at 12:47 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
<konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 03:39:09PM -0500, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>> On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 05:49:08PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> > On 09/01/2018 17:23, Arjan van de Ven wrote:
>> > > On 1/9/2018 8:17 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> > >> On 09/01/2018 16:19, Arjan van de Ven wrote:
>> > >>> On 1/9/2018 7:00 AM, Liran Alon wrote:
>> > >>>>
>> > >>>> ----- arjan@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx wrote:
>> > >>>>
>> > >>>>> On 1/9/2018 3:41 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> > >>>>>> The above ("IBRS simply disables the indirect branch predictor")
>> > >>>>>> was my
>> > >>>>>> take-away message from private discussion with Intel.  My guess is
>> > >>>>>> that
>> > >>>>>> the vendors are just handwaving a spec that doesn't match what
>> > >>>>>> they have
>> > >>>>>> implemented, because honestly a microcode update is unlikely to do
>> > >>>>>> much
>> > >>>>>> more than an old-fashioned chicken bit.  Maybe on Skylake it does
>> > >>>>>> though, since the performance characteristics of IBRS are so
>> > >>>>>> different
>> > >>>>>> from previous processors.  Let's ask Arjan who might have more
>> > >>>>>> information about it, and hope he actually can disclose it...
>> > >>>>>
>> > >>>>> IBRS will ensure that, when set after the ring transition, no earlier
>> > >>>>> branch prediction data is used for indirect branches while IBRS is
>> > >>>>> set
>> > >>
>> > >> Let me ask you my questions, which are independent of L0/L1/L2
>> > >> terminology.
>> > >>
>> > >> 1) Is vmentry/vmexit considered a ring transition, even if the guest is
>> > >> running in ring 0?  If IBRS=1 in the guest and the host is using IBRS,
>> > >> the host will not do a wrmsr on exit.  Is this safe for the host kernel?
>> > >
>> > > I think the CPU folks would want us to write the msr again.
>> >
>> > Want us, or need us---and if we don't do that, what happens?  And if we
>> > have to do it, how is IBRS=1 different from an IBPB?...
>>
>> Arjan says 'ring transition' but I am pretty sure it is more of 'prediction
>> mode change'. And from what I have gathered so far moving from lower (guest)
>> to higher (hypervisor) has no bearing on the branch predicator. Meaning
>> the guest ring0 can attack us if we don't touch this MSR.
>>
>> We have to WRMSR 0x48 to 1 to flush out lower prediction. Aka this is a
>> 'reset' button and at every 'prediction mode' you have to hit this.
>
> I suppose means that when we VMENTER the original fix (where we
> compare the host to guest) can stay - as we entering an lower prediction
> mode. I wonder then what does writting 0 do to it? A nop?
>
>>
>>
>> <sigh> Can we have a discussion on making an kvm-security mailing list
>> where we can figure all this out during embargo and not have these
>> misunderstandings.
>>
>> >
>> > Since I am at it, what happens on *current generation* CPUs if you
>> > always leave IBRS=1?  Slow and safe, or fast and unsafe?
>> >
>> > >> 2) How will the future processors work where IBRS should always be =1?
>> > >
>> > > IBRS=1 should be "fire and forget this ever happened".
>> > > This is the only time anyone should use IBRS in practice
>> >
>> > And IBPB too I hope?  But besides that, I need to know exactly how that
>> > is implemented to ensure that it's doing the right thing.
>> >
>> > > (and then the host turns it on and makes sure to not expose it to the
>> > > guests I hope)
>> >
>> > That's not that easy, because guests might have support for SPEC_CTRL
>> > but not for IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES.
>> >
>> > You could disable the SPEC_CTRL bit, but then the guest might think it
>> > is not secure.  It might also actually *be* insecure, if you migrated to
>> > an older CPU where IBRS is not fire-and-forget.
>> >
>> > Paolo