RE: [patch RFC 5/5] x86/speculation: Add basic speculation control code

[Van De Ven, Arjan]

> Andrea, what you're saying is directly contradicting what I've heard
> from Intel.
> 
> The documentation already distinguishes between IBRS on current
> hardware, and IBRS_ATT on future hardware. If it was the case that IBRS
> on current hardware is a set-and-forget option and completely disables
> branch prediction, then they would say that. Rather than explicitly
> saying the *opposite*, specifically for the case of current hardware,
> as they do.
> 
> Rather than continuing to debate it, perhaps it's best just to wake for
> the US to wake up, and Intel to give a definitive answer.

On current hardware, you cannot just set IBRS always.


(In practice, on some you might get lucky if you try. Intel does not guarantee it. Intel does not test it. The model is to write the msr on privilege change, e.g. ring transition)