Re: [PATCH 34/35] x86/kvm: Add IBPB support

[Paolo Bonzini]

On 18/01/2018 14:48, Peter Zijlstra wrote:
> From: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx>
> 
> Add MSR passthrough for MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD and place branch predictor
> barriers on switching between VMs to avoid inter VM specte-v2 attacks.
> 
> [peterz: rebase and changelog rewrite]
> 
> Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm.c |    8 ++++++++
>  arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c |    8 ++++++++
>  2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)

This patch is missing the AMD-specific CPUID bit.

In addition, it is not bisectable because guests will see the SPEC_CTRL CPUID
bit after patch 32 even if PRED_CMD is not supported yet.

The simplest solutions are:

1) add the indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() calls first, and squash
everything else including the AMD CPUID bit into a single patch.  

2) place the IBPB in this series, and only add stop/restart_indirect_branch_
speculation() to the vmexit and vmentry paths.  We will do the guest enabling
in kvm.git after this is ready, it should only take a week and we'll ensure
it is backportable to 4.14 and 4.15.

3) same as (2) except we'll send the guest enabling through TIP.

Paolo

> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ static const struct svm_direct_access_ms
>  	{ .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK,			.always = true  },
>  #endif
>  	{ .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,          .always = true  },
> +	{ .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,           .always = true },
>  	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP,		.always = false },
>  	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP,		.always = false },
>  	{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP,		.always = false },
> @@ -532,6 +533,7 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
>  	struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
>  
>  	struct page *save_area;
> +	struct vmcb *current_vmcb;
>  };
>  
>  static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data);
> @@ -1709,11 +1711,13 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcp
>  	__free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
>  	kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
>  	kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm);
> +	indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
>  }
>  
>  static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
>  {
>  	struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
> +	struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
>  	int i;
>  
>  	if (unlikely(cpu != vcpu->cpu)) {
> @@ -1742,6 +1746,10 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcp
>  	if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
>  		wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, svm->tsc_aux);
>  
> +	if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
> +		sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
> +		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
> +	}
>  	avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
>  }
>  
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
> @@ -2280,6 +2280,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcp
>  	if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
>  		per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
>  		vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
> +		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
>  	}
>  
>  	if (!already_loaded) {
> @@ -3837,6 +3838,11 @@ static void free_loaded_vmcs(struct load
>  	free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
>  	loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL;
>  	WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL);
> +	/*
> +	 * The VMCS could be recycled, causing a false negative in vmx_vcpu_load
> +	 * block speculative execution.
> +	 */
> +	indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();

This IBPB is not needed, as loaded_vmcs->NULL is now NULL and there will be a
barrier the next time vmx_vcpu_load is called on this CPU.

Thanks,

Paolo

>  }
>  
>  static void free_kvm_area(void)
> @@ -6804,6 +6810,8 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
>  	 */
>  	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
>  		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, false);
> +	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
> +		vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, false);
>  
>  	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_FS_BASE, false);
>  	vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(MSR_GS_BASE, false);
> 
>