Hello Matt,
On Tue, Jan 23, 2018 at 03:35:14PM +0000, Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
Hi Serge,
On 19/01/18 14:27, Serge Semin wrote:
On Fri, Jan 19, 2018 at 07:59:43AM +0000, Matt Redfearn <matt.redfearn@xxxxxxxx> wrote:
Hello Matt,
Hi Serge,
On 18/01/18 20:18, Serge Semin wrote:
On Thu, Jan 18, 2018 at 12:03:03PM -0800, Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 01/17/2018 02:23 PM, Serge Semin wrote:
It is useful to have the kernel virtual memory layout printed
at boot time so to have the full information about the booted
kernel. In some cases it might be unsafe to have virtual
addresses freely visible in logs, so the %pK format is used if
one want to hide them.
Signed-off-by: Serge Semin <fancer.lancer@xxxxxxxxx>
I personally like having that information because that helps debug and
have a quick reference, but there appears to be a trend to remove this
in the name of security:
https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/10124007/
maybe hide this behind a configuration option?
Yeah, arm code was the place I picked the function up.) But in my case
I've used %pK so the pointers would disappear from logging when
kptr_restrict sysctl is 1 or 2.
I agree, that we might need to make the printouts optional. If there is
any kernel config, which for instance increases the kernel security we
could also use it or anything else to discard the printouts at compile
time.
Certainly, when KASLR is active it would be preferable to hide this
information, so you could use CONFIG_RELOCATABLE. The existing KASLR stuff
additionally hides this kind of information behind CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL, so
that only people actively debugging the kernel see it:
http://elixir.free-electrons.com/linux/v4.15-rc8/source/arch/mips/kernel/setup.c#L604
Ok. I'll hide the printouts behind both of that config macros in the next patchset
version.
Another thing to note - since ad67b74d2469d ("printk: hash addresses printed
with %p") %pK at this time in the boot process is useless since the RNG is
not sufficiently initialised and all prints end up being "(ptrval)". Hence
after v4.15-rc2 we end up with output like:
[ 0.000000] Kernel virtual memory layout:
[ 0.000000] lowmem : 0x(ptrval) - 0x(ptrval) ( 256 MB)
[ 0.000000] .text : 0x(ptrval) - 0x(ptrval) (7374 kB)
[ 0.000000] .data : 0x(ptrval) - 0x(ptrval) (1901 kB)
[ 0.000000] .init : 0x(ptrval) - 0x(ptrval) (1600 kB)
[ 0.000000] .bss : 0x(ptrval) - 0x(ptrval) ( 415 kB)
[ 0.000000] vmalloc : 0x(ptrval) - 0x(ptrval) (1023 MB)
[ 0.000000] fixmap : 0x(ptrval) - 0x(ptrval) ( 68 kB)
It must be some bug in the algo. What point in the %pK then? According to
the documentation the only way to see the pointers is when (kptr_restrict == 0).
But if it is we don't get into the restricted_pointer() method at all:
http://elixir.free-electrons.com/linux/v4.15-rc9/source/lib/vsprintf.c#L1934
In this case the vsprintf() executes the method ptr_to_id(), which of course
default to _not_ leak addresses, and hash it before printing.
Really %pK isn't supposed to be dependent from RNG at all since kptr_restrict
doesn't do any value randomization.
The %px format specifier was added for cases such as this, where we really
want to print the unmodified address. And as long as this function is
suitably guarded to only do this when KASLR is deactivated /
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL is activated, etc, then we are not unwittingly leaking
information - we are deliberately making it available.
If %pK would work as it's stated by the kernel documentation:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/Documentation/printk-formats.txt
then the only change I'd suggest to have here is to close the kernel memory
layout printout method by the CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL ifdef-macro. The kptr_restrict
should default to 1/2 if the KASLR is activated:
https://lwn.net/Articles/444556/
Regards,
-Sergey
Thanks,
Matt
Regards,
-Sergey
Thanks,
Matt
--
Florian