Re: [PATCH v4 07/10] x86: narrow out of bounds syscalls to sys_read under speculation

[Jiri Slaby]

On 01/19/2018, 01:02 AM, Dan Williams wrote:
> The syscall table base is a user controlled function pointer in kernel
> space. Like, 'get_user, use 'MASK_NOSPEC' to prevent any out of bounds
> speculation. While retpoline prevents speculating into the user
> controlled target it does not stop the pointer de-reference, the concern
> is leaking memory relative to the syscall table base.
> 
> Reported-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: x86@xxxxxxxxxx
> Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
> Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S   |    2 ++
>  arch/x86/include/asm/smap.h |    9 ++++++++-
>  2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> index 4f8e1d35a97c..2320017077d4 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> +++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
>  #include <asm/asm.h>
>  #include <asm/smap.h>
>  #include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
> +#include <asm/smap.h>

This is already included 2 lines above

thanks,
-- 
js
suse labs