[GIT PULL] x86/cleanups for v4.16
From: Ingo Molnar
Date: Mon Jan 29 2018 - 06:17:55 EST
Linus,
Please pull the latest x86-cleanups-for-linus git tree from:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86-cleanups-for-linus
# HEAD: 782bf20c2a1795f35dcd526aa8005cd1870745da x86: Remove unused IOMMU_STRESS Kconfig
Misc cleanups.
Thanks,
Ingo
------------------>
Andi Kleen (2):
x86/timer: Don't inline __const_udelay
x86/extable: Mark exception handler functions visible
Corentin Labbe (1):
x86: Remove unused IOMMU_STRESS Kconfig
Pravin Shedge (1):
x86/headers: Remove duplicate #includes
arch/x86/Kconfig.debug | 8 --------
arch/x86/kernel/itmt.c | 1 -
arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 1 -
arch/x86/kernel/setup.c | 1 -
arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c | 1 -
arch/x86/lib/delay.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c | 1 -
arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c | 2 --
9 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
index 6293a8768a91..49fb85a5a2b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig.debug
@@ -169,14 +169,6 @@ config IOMMU_DEBUG
options. See Documentation/x86/x86_64/boot-options.txt for more
details.
-config IOMMU_STRESS
- bool "Enable IOMMU stress-test mode"
- ---help---
- This option disables various optimizations in IOMMU related
- code to do real stress testing of the IOMMU code. This option
- will cause a performance drop and should only be enabled for
- testing.
-
config IOMMU_LEAK
bool "IOMMU leak tracing"
depends on IOMMU_DEBUG && DMA_API_DEBUG
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/itmt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/itmt.c
index f73f475d0573..d177940aa090 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/itmt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/itmt.c
@@ -24,7 +24,6 @@
#include <linux/cpumask.h>
#include <linux/cpuset.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/sysctl.h>
#include <linux/nodemask.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
index bb988a24db92..d6321855f9da 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/process.c
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@
#include <linux/dmi.h>
#include <linux/utsname.h>
#include <linux/stackprotector.h>
-#include <linux/tick.h>
#include <linux/cpuidle.h>
#include <trace/events/power.h>
#include <linux/hw_breakpoint.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 8af2e8d0c0a1..c8e04472a141 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -114,7 +114,6 @@
#include <asm/alternative.h>
#include <asm/prom.h>
#include <asm/microcode.h>
-#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
#include <asm/kaslr.h>
#include <asm/unwind.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
index 05a97d5fe298..d44b64d571b4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c
@@ -75,7 +75,6 @@
#include <asm/uv/uv.h>
#include <linux/mc146818rtc.h>
#include <asm/i8259.h>
-#include <asm/realmode.h>
#include <asm/misc.h>
#include <asm/qspinlock.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/delay.c b/arch/x86/lib/delay.c
index 553f8fd23cc4..09c83b2f80d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/delay.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/delay.c
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ void __delay(unsigned long loops)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__delay);
-inline void __const_udelay(unsigned long xloops)
+void __const_udelay(unsigned long xloops)
{
unsigned long lpj = this_cpu_read(cpu_info.loops_per_jiffy) ? : loops_per_jiffy;
int d0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
index 9fe656c42aa5..45f5d6cf65ae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c
@@ -21,16 +21,16 @@ ex_fixup_handler(const struct exception_table_entry *x)
return (ex_handler_t)((unsigned long)&x->handler + x->handler);
}
-bool ex_handler_default(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
- struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
+__visible bool ex_handler_default(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
return true;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_default);
-bool ex_handler_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
- struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
+__visible bool ex_handler_fault(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
regs->ax = trapnr;
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_fault);
* Handler for UD0 exception following a failed test against the
* result of a refcount inc/dec/add/sub.
*/
-bool ex_handler_refcount(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
- struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
+__visible bool ex_handler_refcount(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
/* First unconditionally saturate the refcount. */
*(int *)regs->cx = INT_MIN / 2;
@@ -95,8 +95,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_refcount);
* of vulnerability by restoring from the initial state (essentially, zeroing
* out all the FPU registers) if we can't restore from the task's FPU state.
*/
-bool ex_handler_fprestore(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
- struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
+__visible bool ex_handler_fprestore(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
regs->ip = ex_fixup_addr(fixup);
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ bool ex_handler_fprestore(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ex_handler_fprestore);
-bool ex_handler_ext(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
- struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
+__visible bool ex_handler_ext(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
/* Special hack for uaccess_err */
current->thread.uaccess_err = 1;
@@ -118,8 +118,8 @@ bool ex_handler_ext(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_ext);
-bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
- struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
+__visible bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
if (pr_warn_once("unchecked MSR access error: RDMSR from 0x%x at rIP: 0x%lx (%pF)\n",
(unsigned int)regs->cx, regs->ip, (void *)regs->ip))
@@ -133,8 +133,8 @@ bool ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_rdmsr_unsafe);
-bool ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
- struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
+__visible bool ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
if (pr_warn_once("unchecked MSR access error: WRMSR to 0x%x (tried to write 0x%08x%08x) at rIP: 0x%lx (%pF)\n",
(unsigned int)regs->cx, (unsigned int)regs->dx,
@@ -147,8 +147,8 @@ bool ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_wrmsr_unsafe);
-bool ex_handler_clear_fs(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
- struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
+__visible bool ex_handler_clear_fs(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
+ struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
{
if (static_cpu_has(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG))
asm volatile ("mov %0, %%fs" : : "rm" (__USER_DS));
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ bool ex_handler_clear_fs(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ex_handler_clear_fs);
-bool ex_has_fault_handler(unsigned long ip)
+__visible bool ex_has_fault_handler(unsigned long ip)
{
const struct exception_table_entry *e;
ex_handler_t handler;
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
index 6a151ce70e86..1e5184d7ce7a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
#include <linux/spinlock.h>
#include <linux/bootmem.h>
#include <linux/ioport.h>
-#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/mc146818rtc.h>
#include <linux/efi.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c b/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c
index 02f3445a2b5f..cd97a62394e7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/spinlock.c
@@ -23,8 +23,6 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(int, lock_kicker_irq) = -1;
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(char *, irq_name);
static bool xen_pvspin = true;
-#include <asm/qspinlock.h>
-
static void xen_qlock_kick(int cpu)
{
int irq = per_cpu(lock_kicker_irq, cpu);