[PATCH v3 2/4] KVM: x86: Add IBPB support
From: KarimAllah Ahmed
Date: Mon Jan 29 2018 - 19:11:57 EST
From: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx>
Add MSR passthrough for MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD and place branch predictor
barriers on switching between VMs to avoid inter VM Spectre-v2 attacks.
[peterz: rebase and changelog rewrite]
[karahmed: - rebase
- vmx: expose PRED_CMD whenever it is available
- svm: only pass through IBPB if it is available
- vmx: support !cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()]
[dwmw2: Expose CPUID bit too (AMD IBPB only for now as we lack IBRS)
PRED_CMD is a write-only MSR]
Cc: Asit Mallick <asit.k.mallick@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Arjan Van De Ven <arjan.van.de.ven@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Jun Nakajima <jun.nakajima@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Greg KH <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Ashok Raj <ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1515720739-43819-6-git-send-email-ashok.raj@xxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@xxxxxxxxx>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 11 ++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 12 ++++++++++++
3 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index c0eb337..033004d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -365,6 +365,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
F(3DNOWPREFETCH) | F(OSVW) | 0 /* IBS */ | F(XOP) |
0 /* SKINIT, WDT, LWP */ | F(FMA4) | F(TBM);
+ /* cpuid 0x80000008.ebx */
+ const u32 kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features =
+ F(IBPB);
+
/* cpuid 0xC0000001.edx */
const u32 kvm_cpuid_C000_0001_edx_x86_features =
F(XSTORE) | F(XSTORE_EN) | F(XCRYPT) | F(XCRYPT_EN) |
@@ -625,7 +629,12 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_ent(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function,
if (!g_phys_as)
g_phys_as = phys_as;
entry->eax = g_phys_as | (virt_as << 8);
- entry->ebx = entry->edx = 0;
+ entry->edx = 0;
+ /* IBPB isn't necessarily present in hardware cpuid */
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+ entry->ebx |= F(IBPB);
+ entry->ebx &= kvm_cpuid_8000_0008_ebx_x86_features;
+ cpuid_mask(&entry->ebx, CPUID_8000_0008_EBX);
break;
}
case 0x80000019:
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 2744b973..c886e46 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -529,6 +529,7 @@ struct svm_cpu_data {
struct kvm_ldttss_desc *tss_desc;
struct page *save_area;
+ struct vmcb *current_vmcb;
};
static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct svm_cpu_data *, svm_data);
@@ -918,6 +919,9 @@ static void svm_vcpu_init_msrpm(u32 *msrpm)
set_msr_interception(msrpm, direct_access_msrs[i].index, 1, 1);
}
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+ set_msr_interception(msrpm, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, 1, 1);
}
static void add_msr_offset(u32 offset)
@@ -1706,11 +1710,17 @@ static void svm_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
__free_pages(virt_to_page(svm->nested.msrpm), MSRPM_ALLOC_ORDER);
kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, svm);
+ /*
+ * The vmcb page can be recycled, causing a false negative in
+ * svm_vcpu_load(). So do a full IBPB now.
+ */
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
}
static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
{
struct vcpu_svm *svm = to_svm(vcpu);
+ struct svm_cpu_data *sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
int i;
if (unlikely(cpu != vcpu->cpu)) {
@@ -1739,6 +1749,10 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
wrmsrl(MSR_TSC_AUX, svm->tsc_aux);
+ if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
+ sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+ }
avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
index aa8638a..ea278ce 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -2272,6 +2272,7 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
+ indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
}
if (!already_loaded) {
@@ -3330,6 +3331,14 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
case MSR_IA32_TSC:
kvm_write_tsc(vcpu, msr_info);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
+ if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+ !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (data & PRED_CMD_IBPB)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
if (!kvm_mtrr_valid(vcpu, MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, data))
@@ -9548,6 +9557,9 @@ static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
goto free_msrs;
msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
+
+ if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+ vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, MSR_TYPE_W);
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
--
2.7.4