Re: [PATCH 1/2] arm64: Relax constraints on ID feature bits

From: Suzuki K Poulose
Date: Wed Feb 07 2018 - 08:24:28 EST


On 07/02/18 12:34, Dave Martin wrote:
On Wed, Feb 07, 2018 at 11:41:17AM +0000, Suzuki K Poulose wrote:
On 07/02/18 10:40, Dave Martin wrote:

...

To summarise, I can add LOR/HPD changes. But the others requires a bit more
work and can be done as a separate series.

I've wondered in the past whether there is redundancy between the strict
and type fields, but when adding entries I just copy-pasted similar ones
rather than fully understanding what was going on...

I agree. These were defined before we started using the system wide safe
values and enforcing the capabilities on late/secondary CPUs. Now that
we have an infrastructure which makes sure that conflicts are handled,
we could relax the definitions a bit.

OK, I this sounds reasonable and I think it all falls under "potential
future cleanups".

A few nits below.

[...]

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c

[...]

- ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR0_ASID_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+ /* We handle differing ASID widths by explicit checks to make sure the system is safe */

Where is this checked? Because of the risk of breaking this
relationship during maintenance, perhaps we should have a comment in
both places.

This is checked via verify_cpu_asid_bits() from check_early_cpu_features(), on all
secondary CPUs. I will mention it in the comment.

- ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR1_VHE_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+ /* When CONFIG_ARM64_VHE is enabled, we ensure that there is no conflict */

Similarly to _ASID, where/how?


This is done via verify_cpu_run_el() from check_early_cpu_features(). But with the rewrite
of the capabilities frame work, we move it to the capabilities infrastructure BOOT_CPU features.

static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64mmfr2[] = {
ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_LVA_SHIFT, 4, 0),
- ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_HIDDEN, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64MMFR2_IESB_SHIFT, 4, 0),
+ /* While IESB is good to have, it is not fatal if we miss this on some CPUs */

Maybe this deserves slightly more explanation. We could say that
lacking implicit IESB on exception boundary on a subset of CPUs is no
worse than lacking it on all of them.

OK.

Cheers
Suzuki