On Wed, 2018-03-21 at 08:42 -0500, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote:
In preparation to enabling -Wvla, remove VLAs and replace them
with dynamic memory allocation instead.
The use of stack Variable Length Arrays needs to be avoided, as they
can be a vector for stack exhaustion, which can be both a runtime bug
or a security flaw. Also, in general, as code evolves it is easy to
lose track of how big a VLA can get. Thus, we can end up having runtime
failures that are hard to debug.
Also, fixed as part of the directive to remove all VLAs from
the kernel: https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/3/7/621
Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva <gustavo@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c b/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c
index 2fb6558..c9444bf 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/aes_cmac.c
@@ -27,30 +27,42 @@ static const u8 zero[CMAC_TLEN_256];
void ieee80211_aes_cmac(struct crypto_shash *tfm, const u8 *aad,
const u8 *data, size_t data_len, u8 *mic)
{
- SHASH_DESC_ON_STACK(desc, tfm);
+ struct shash_desc *shash;
u8 out[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
- desc->tfm = tfm;
+ shash = kmalloc(sizeof(*shash) + crypto_shash_descsize(tfm),
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!shash)
+ return;
Honestly, this seems like a really bad idea - you're now hitting
kmalloc for every TX/RX frame here.
SHA_DESC_ON_STACK() should just be fixed to not need a VLA, but take
some sort of maximum, I guess?