[PATCH v2] ethtool: fix a potential missing-check bug

From: Wenwen Wang
Date: Mon Apr 30 2018 - 13:32:05 EST

In ethtool_get_rxnfc(), the object "info" is firstly copied from
user-space. If the FLOW_RSS flag is set in the member field flow_type of
"info" (and cmd is ETHTOOL_GRXFH), info needs to be copied again from
user-space because FLOW_RSS is newer and has new definition, as mentioned
in the comment. However, given that the user data resides in user-space, a
malicious user can race to change the data after the first copy. By doing
so, the user can inject inconsistent data. For example, in the second
copy, the FLOW_RSS flag could be cleared in the field flow_type of "info".
In the following execution, "info" will be used in the function
ops->get_rxnfc(). Such inconsistent data can potentially lead to unexpected
information leakage since ops->get_rxnfc() will prepare various types of
data according to flow_type, and the prepared data will be eventually
copied to user-space. This inconsistent data may also cause undefined
behaviors based on how ops->get_rxnfc() is implemented.

This patch simply re-verifies the flow_type field of "info" after the
second copy. If the value is not as expected, an error code will be

Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wang6495@xxxxxxx>
net/core/ethtool.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/core/ethtool.c b/net/core/ethtool.c
index 03416e6..ba02f0d 100644
--- a/net/core/ethtool.c
+++ b/net/core/ethtool.c
@@ -1032,6 +1032,11 @@ static noinline_for_stack int ethtool_get_rxnfc(struct net_device *dev,
info_size = sizeof(info);
if (copy_from_user(&info, useraddr, info_size))
return -EFAULT;
+ /* Since malicious users may modify the original data,
+ * we need to check whether FLOW_RSS is still requested.
+ */
+ if (!(info.flow_type & FLOW_RSS))
+ return -EINVAL;

if (info.cmd == ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL) {