Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack

From: Alexander Popov
Date: Thu May 03 2018 - 12:05:56 EST

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Hello Laura and Kees,

On 03.05.2018 02:07, Laura Abbott wrote:
> On 05/02/2018 02:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Wed, May 2, 2018 at 1:33 PM, Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>>
>>> Implementation of stackleak based heavily on the x86 version
>>
>> Awesome! Notes below for both you and Alexander, since I think we can
>> create a common code base instead of having near-duplicates in the
>> arch/ trees...

Yes, sure.

I will extract the common part and send v12 for x86. Then Laura will be able to
add arm64 support in a separate patch series. Is it fine?

>>> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott <labbott@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>> ---
>>> Now written in C instead of a bunch of assembly.
>>> ---
>>> arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +
>>> arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 6 ++++
>>> arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 3 ++
>>> arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 6 ++++
>>> arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>>> arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 16 ++++++++++
>>> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 +-
>>> scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins | 5 +++-
>>> 8 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>> create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>>> index eb2cf4938f6d..b0221db95dc9 100644
>>> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
>>> @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ config ARM64
>>> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS
>>> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT
>>> select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
>>> + select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
>>> select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
>>> select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
>>> select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE
>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
>>> index 767598932549..d31ab80ff647 100644
>>> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h
>>> @@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ struct thread_struct {
>>> unsigned long fault_address; /* fault info */
>>> unsigned long fault_code; /* ESR_EL1 value */
>>> struct debug_info debug; /* debugging */
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>>> + unsigned long lowest_stack;
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
>>> + unsigned long prev_lowest_stack;
>>> +#endif
>>> +#endif
>>
>> I wonder if x86 and arm64 could include a common struct here that was
>> empty when the plugin is disabled... it would keep the ifdefs in one
>> place. Maybe include/linux/stackleak.h could be:
>>
>> ---start---
>> /* Poison value points to the unused hole in the virtual memory map */
>> #define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF
>> #define STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH 128
>>
>> struct stackleak {
>> #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>> unsigned long lowest;
>> #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
>> unsigned long prev_lowest;
>> #endif
>> #endif
>> };
>>
>
> Is this well defined across all compilers if the plugin is off?
> This seems to compile with gcc at least but 0 sized structs
> make me a little uneasy.

Empty struct is not defined by C standard but is permitted by gcc
https://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/Empty-Structures.html#Empty-Structures

Fast example:

#include <stdio.h>

int main(void)
{
struct a {};

printf("size %zu\n", sizeof(struct a));

return 0;
}

# gcc -pedantic t.c -o t
t.c: In function âmainâ:
t.c:5:9: warning: struct has no members [-Wpedantic]
struct a {};
^

# clang -Weverything t.c -o tc
t.c:5:2: warning: empty struct has size 0 in C, size 1 in C++ [-Wc++-compat]
struct a {};
^
t.c:5:2: warning: empty struct is a GNU extension [-Wgnu-empty-struct]
2 warnings generated.

But both programs print "size 0". There are a lot of empty structs around the
kernel, so I'll create another one.

>> asmlinkage void erase_kstack(void);
>> ---eof---
>>
>> and arch/*/include/asm/processor.h could do:
>>
>> @@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ struct thread_struct {
>> unsigned long fault_address; /* fault info */
>> unsigned long fault_code; /* ESR_EL1 value */
>> struct debug_info debug; /* debugging */
>> + struct stackleak stackleak;
>>
>> and arch/x86/entry/erase.c could move to maybe kernel/stackleak.c?
>> (Oh, I notice this needs an SPDX line too.)

Thanks, I'll add it.

>>> static inline void arch_thread_struct_whitelist(unsigned long *offset,
>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
>>> index bf825f38d206..0ceea613c65b 100644
>>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile
>>> @@ -55,6 +55,9 @@ arm64-reloc-test-y := reloc_test_core.o reloc_test_syms.o
>>> arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o
>>> arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE) += sdei.o
>>>
>>> +arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += erase.o
>>> +KASAN_SANITIZE_erase.o := n
>>> +
>>> obj-y += $(arm64-obj-y) vdso/ probes/
>>> obj-m += $(arm64-obj-m)
>>> head-y := head.o
>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>>> index ec2ee720e33e..3144f1ebdc18 100644
>>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
>>> @@ -401,6 +401,11 @@ tsk .req x28 // current thread_info
>>>
>>> .text
>>>
>>> + .macro ERASE_KSTACK
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>>> + bl erase_kstack
>>> +#endif
>>> + .endm
>>> /*
>>> * Exception vectors.
>>> */
>>> @@ -906,6 +911,7 @@ ret_to_user:
>>> cbnz x2, work_pending
>>> finish_ret_to_user:
>>> enable_step_tsk x1, x2
>>> + ERASE_KSTACK
>>> kernel_exit 0
>>> ENDPROC(ret_to_user)
>>
>> Nice. All of the return paths end up here (I went looking for
>> ret_from_fork's path). :)
>>
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 000000000000..b8b5648d893b
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c
>>> @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
>>> +#include <linux/bug.h>
>>> +#include <linux/sched.h>
>>> +#include <asm/current.h>
>>> +#include <asm/linkage.h>
>>> +#include <asm/processor.h>
>>> +
>>> +asmlinkage void erase_kstack(void)
>>> +{
>>> + unsigned long p = current->thread.lowest_stack;
>>> + unsigned long boundary = p & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1);
>>> + unsigned long poison = 0;
>>> + const unsigned long check_depth = STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH /
>>> + sizeof(unsigned long);
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * Let's search for the poison value in the stack.
>>> + * Start from the lowest_stack and go to the bottom.
>>> + */
>>> + while (p > boundary && poison <= check_depth) {
>>> + if (*(unsigned long *)p == STACKLEAK_POISON)
>>> + poison++;
>>> + else
>>> + poison = 0;
>>> +
>>> + p -= sizeof(unsigned long);
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * One long int at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and
>>> + * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK).
>>> + */
>>> + if (p == boundary)
>>> + p += sizeof(unsigned long);
>>> +
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS
>>> + current->thread.prev_lowest_stack = p;
>>> +#endif
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * So let's write the poison value to the kernel stack.
>>> + * Start from the address in p and move up till the new boundary.
>>> + */
>>> + boundary = current_stack_pointer;
>>
>> This is the only difference between x86 and arm64 in this code. What
>> do you think about implementing on_thread_stack() to match x86:
>>
>> if (on_thread_stack())
>> boundary = current_stack_pointer;
>> else
>> boundary = current_top_of_stack();
>>
>> then we could make this common code too instead of having two copies in arch/?
>>
>
> The issue isn't on_thread_stack, it's current_top_of_stack which isn't
> defined on arm64. I agree it would be good if the code would be common
> but I'm not sure how much we want to start trying to force APIs.
>
>>> + BUG_ON(boundary - p >= THREAD_SIZE);
>>> +
>>> + while (p < boundary) {
>>> + *(unsigned long *)p = STACKLEAK_POISON;
>>> + p += sizeof(unsigned long);
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + /* Reset the lowest_stack value for the next syscall */
>>> + current->thread.lowest_stack = current_stack_pointer;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
>>> index f08a2ed9db0d..156fa0a0da19 100644
>>> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
>>> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c
>>> @@ -364,6 +364,9 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start,
>>> p->thread.cpu_context.pc = (unsigned long)ret_from_fork;
>>> p->thread.cpu_context.sp = (unsigned long)childregs;
>>>
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>>> + p->thread.lowest_stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p);
>>> +#endif

I think it should be (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p) + sizeof(unsigned long).

>>> ptrace_hw_copy_thread(p);
>>>
>>> return 0;
>>> @@ -493,3 +496,16 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void)
>>> {
>>> current->mm->context.flags = is_compat_task() ? MMCF_AARCH32 : 0;
>>> }
>>> +
>>> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>>> +void __used check_alloca(unsigned long size)
>>> +{
>>> + unsigned long sp, stack_left;
>>> +
>>> + sp = current_stack_pointer;
>>> +
>>> + stack_left = sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1);
>>> + BUG_ON(stack_left < 256 || size >= stack_left - 256);
>>> +}
>>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_alloca);
>>
>> This is pretty different from x86. Is this just an artifact of ORC, or
>> something else?
>>
>
> This was based on the earlier version of x86. I'll confess to
> not seeing how the current x86 version ended up with get_stack_info
> but I suspect it's either related to ORC unwinding or it's best
> practice.

I've changed that in v4. Quote from the changelog:
- Fixed the surplus and erroneous code for calculating stack_left in
check_alloca() on x86_64. That code repeats the work which is already
done in get_stack_info() and it misses the fact that different
exception stacks on x86_64 have different size.

http://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2017/10/04/68

We can see that in arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack_64.c.

Is it fine if check_alloca() would be arch-specific?

>>> +#endif
>>> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
>>> index a34e9290a699..25dd2a14560d 100644
>>> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
>>> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile
>>> @@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt
>>> KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(cflags-y) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \
>>> -D__NO_FORTIFY \
>>> $(call cc-option,-ffreestanding) \
>>> - $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector)
>>> + $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) \
>>> + $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN)
>>>
>>> GCOV_PROFILE := n
>>> KASAN_SANITIZE := n
>>> diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
>>> index 8d6070fc538f..6cc0e35d3324 100644
>>> --- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
>>> +++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins
>>> @@ -37,11 +37,14 @@ ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS
>>>
>>> gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += stackleak_plugin.so
>>> gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += -DSTACKLEAK_PLUGIN -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-track-min-size=$(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE)
>>> + ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK
>>> + DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable
>>> + endif
>>>
>>> GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS := $(strip $(addprefix -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/, $(gcc-plugin-y)) $(gcc-plugin-cflags-y))
>>>
>>> export PLUGINCC GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS GCC_PLUGIN GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR
>>> - export SANCOV_PLUGIN DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN
>>> + export SANCOV_PLUGIN DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN
>>>
>>> ifneq ($(PLUGINCC),)
>>> # SANCOV_PLUGIN can be only in CFLAGS_KCOV because avoid duplication.
>>> --
>>> 2.14.3
>>>

Best regards,
Alexander

Next message: Martin Steigerwald: "Spectre V2: Eight new security holes in Intel processors"
Previous message: Casey Schaufler: "Re: [PATCH 2/3] kexec: call LSM hook for kexec_load syscall"
In reply to: Kees Cook: "Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack"
Next in thread: Kees Cook: "Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack"
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