[tip:x86/urgent] kprobes/x86: Prohibit probing on exception masking instructions
From: tip-bot for Masami Hiramatsu
Date: Sun May 13 2018 - 13:58:25 EST
Commit-ID: ee6a7354a3629f9b65bc18dbe393503e9440d6f5
Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/ee6a7354a3629f9b65bc18dbe393503e9440d6f5
Author: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@xxxxxxxxxx>
AuthorDate: Wed, 9 May 2018 21:58:15 +0900
Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
CommitDate: Sun, 13 May 2018 19:52:55 +0200
kprobes/x86: Prohibit probing on exception masking instructions
Since MOV SS and POP SS instructions will delay the exceptions until the
next instruction is executed, single-stepping on it by kprobes must be
prohibited.
However, kprobes usually executes those instructions directly on trampoline
buffer (a.k.a. kprobe-booster), except for the kprobes which has
post_handler. Thus if kprobe user probes MOV SS with post_handler, it will
do single-stepping on the MOV SS.
This means it is safe that if it is used via ftrace or perf/bpf since those
don't use the post_handler.
Anyway, since the stack switching is a rare case, it is safer just
rejecting kprobes on such instructions.
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Ricardo Neri <ricardo.neri-calderon@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Francis Deslauriers <francis.deslauriers@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@xxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@xxxxxx>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxx>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Cc: "David S . Miller" <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Link: 152587069574.17316.3311695234863248641.stgit@devbox">https://lkml.kernel.org/r/152587069574.17316.3311695234863248641.stgit@devbox
---
arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h
index b3e32b010ab1..c2c01f84df75 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/insn.h
@@ -208,4 +208,22 @@ static inline int insn_offset_immediate(struct insn *insn)
return insn_offset_displacement(insn) + insn->displacement.nbytes;
}
+#define POP_SS_OPCODE 0x1f
+#define MOV_SREG_OPCODE 0x8e
+
+/*
+ * Intel SDM Vol.3A 6.8.3 states;
+ * "Any single-step trap that would be delivered following the MOV to SS
+ * instruction or POP to SS instruction (because EFLAGS.TF is 1) is
+ * suppressed."
+ * This function returns true if @insn is MOV SS or POP SS. On these
+ * instructions, single stepping is suppressed.
+ */
+static inline int insn_masking_exception(struct insn *insn)
+{
+ return insn->opcode.bytes[0] == POP_SS_OPCODE ||
+ (insn->opcode.bytes[0] == MOV_SREG_OPCODE &&
+ X86_MODRM_REG(insn->modrm.bytes[0]) == 2);
+}
+
#endif /* _ASM_X86_INSN_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
index 0715f827607c..6f4d42377fe5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/core.c
@@ -370,6 +370,10 @@ int __copy_instruction(u8 *dest, u8 *src, u8 *real, struct insn *insn)
if (insn->opcode.bytes[0] == BREAKPOINT_INSTRUCTION)
return 0;
+ /* We should not singlestep on the exception masking instructions */
+ if (insn_masking_exception(insn))
+ return 0;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
/* Only x86_64 has RIP relative instructions */
if (insn_rip_relative(insn)) {