[-next PATCH] security: use octal not symbolic permissions
From: Joe Perches
Date: Mon Jun 11 2018 - 15:01:31 EST
Currently security files use a mixture of octal and symbolic styles
for permissions.
Using octal and not symbolic permissions is preferred by many as more
readable.
see: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/2/1945
Prefer the direct use of octal for permissions.
Done using:
$ git ls-files security | \
xargs ./scripts/checkpatch.pl -f --fix-inplace --types=symbolic_perms --strict
and some typing.
Before: $ git grep -P -w "0[0-7]{3,3}" security | wc -l
53
After: $ git grep -P -w "0[0-7]{3,3}" security | wc -l
136
Miscellanea:
o Whitespace neatening and line wrapping around these conversions.
o Remove now superfluous parentheses around direct use of 0600
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 5 ++--
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 23 ++++++++---------
security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 +--
security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 13 +++++-----
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 +--
security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 ++---
security/smack/smackfs.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++-----------------
security/tomoyo/condition.c | 18 ++++++-------
9 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
index 949dd8a48164..c09dc0f3c3fe 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
@@ -2426,10 +2426,9 @@ static int aa_mk_null_file(struct dentry *parent)
}
inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
- inode->i_mode = S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO;
+ inode->i_mode = S_IFCHR | 0666;
inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
- init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO,
- MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
+ init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | 0666, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
aa_null.dentry = dget(dentry);
aa_null.mnt = mntget(mount);
diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
index fbb08bc78bee..6759a70918de 100644
--- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
@@ -1255,45 +1255,42 @@ static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
/* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
- &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+ &aa_g_profile_mode, 0600);
/* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
-module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, 0600);
#endif
/* Debug mode */
bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES);
-module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, 0600);
/* Audit mode */
enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
-module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
- &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, &aa_g_audit, 0600);
/* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
* provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
*/
bool aa_g_audit_header = true;
-module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
- S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, 0600);
/* lock out loading/removal of policy
* TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
* load policy, if lock_policy is set
*/
bool aa_g_lock_policy;
-module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
- S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, 0600);
/* Syscall logging mode */
bool aa_g_logsyscall;
-module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
+module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, 0600);
/* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
-module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);
+module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, 0400);
/* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
* on the loaded policy is done.
@@ -1301,11 +1298,11 @@ module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);
* that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
*/
bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true;
-module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
+module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, 0444);
/* Boot time disable flag */
static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
-module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
+module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, 0444);
static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
{
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
index 354bb5716ce3..3f7707b8aaa7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
@@ -314,9 +314,9 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
-#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
+#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS 0600
#else
-#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS S_IWUSR
+#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS 0200
#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
#endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index ae9d5c766a3c..81700df83f51 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY)
clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
- inode->i_mode &= ~S_IWUSR;
+ inode->i_mode &= ~0200;
#endif
return 0;
}
@@ -465,28 +465,29 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
binary_runtime_measurements =
securityfs_create_file("binary_runtime_measurements",
- S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
+ 0440, ima_dir, NULL,
&ima_measurements_ops);
if (IS_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements))
goto out;
ascii_runtime_measurements =
securityfs_create_file("ascii_runtime_measurements",
- S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
+ 0440, ima_dir, NULL,
&ima_ascii_measurements_ops);
if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements))
goto out;
runtime_measurements_count =
securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count",
- S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
+ 0440, ima_dir, NULL,
&ima_measurements_count_ops);
if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count))
goto out;
violations =
- securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
- ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops);
+ securityfs_create_file("violations",
+ 0440, ima_dir, NULL,
+ &ima_htable_violations_ops);
if (IS_ERR(violations))
goto out;
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index a85fac3345df..8ae043be8782 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -6336,9 +6336,9 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
u32 av = 0;
av = 0;
- if (flag & S_IRUGO)
+ if (flag & 0444)
av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
- if (flag & S_IWUGO)
+ if (flag & 0222)
av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
if (av == 0)
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index f3d374d2ca04..bfecac19ba92 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -1376,7 +1376,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
goto out;
ret = -ENOMEM;
- inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0644);
if (!inode)
goto out;
@@ -1582,10 +1582,10 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
int i;
static const struct tree_descr files[] = {
{ "cache_threshold",
- &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR },
- { "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+ &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, 0644 },
+ { "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, 0444 },
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
- { "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
+ { "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, 0444 },
#endif
};
@@ -1643,7 +1643,7 @@ static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir)
if (!dentry)
return -ENOMEM;
- inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0444);
if (!inode)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
goto out;
rc = -ENOMEM;
- inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0444);
if (!inode)
goto out;
@@ -1774,7 +1774,7 @@ static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index,
if (!dentry)
return -ENOMEM;
- inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0444);
if (!inode)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -1870,7 +1870,7 @@ static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
if (!dentry)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
- inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
+ inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFDIR | 0555);
if (!inode) {
dput(dentry);
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
@@ -1899,25 +1899,24 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
static const struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = {
- [SEL_LOAD] = {"load", &sel_load_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR},
- [SEL_ENFORCE] = {"enforce", &sel_enforce_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
- [SEL_CONTEXT] = {"context", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
- [SEL_ACCESS] = {"access", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
- [SEL_CREATE] = {"create", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
- [SEL_RELABEL] = {"relabel", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
- [SEL_USER] = {"user", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
- [SEL_POLICYVERS] = {"policyvers", &sel_policyvers_ops, S_IRUGO},
- [SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS] = {"commit_pending_bools", &sel_commit_bools_ops, S_IWUSR},
- [SEL_MLS] = {"mls", &sel_mls_ops, S_IRUGO},
- [SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, S_IWUSR},
- [SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
- [SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
- [SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
- [SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
- [SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO},
- [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUGO},
- [SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS] = {"validatetrans", &sel_transition_ops,
- S_IWUGO},
+ [SEL_LOAD] = {"load", &sel_load_ops, 0600},
+ [SEL_ENFORCE] = {"enforce", &sel_enforce_ops, 0644},
+ [SEL_CONTEXT] = {"context", &transaction_ops, 0666},
+ [SEL_ACCESS] = {"access", &transaction_ops, 0666},
+ [SEL_CREATE] = {"create", &transaction_ops, 0666},
+ [SEL_RELABEL] = {"relabel", &transaction_ops, 0666},
+ [SEL_USER] = {"user", &transaction_ops, 0666},
+ [SEL_POLICYVERS] = {"policyvers", &sel_policyvers_ops, 0444},
+ [SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS] = {"commit_pending_bools", &sel_commit_bools_ops, 0200},
+ [SEL_MLS] = {"mls", &sel_mls_ops, 0444},
+ [SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, 0200},
+ [SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, 0666},
+ [SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, 0644},
+ [SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, 0444},
+ [SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, 0444},
+ [SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, 0444},
+ [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, 0444},
+ [SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS] = {"validatetrans", &sel_transition_ops, 0222},
/* last one */ {""}
};
@@ -1943,7 +1942,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
goto err;
ret = -ENOMEM;
- inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO);
+ inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | 0666);
if (!inode)
goto err;
@@ -1953,7 +1952,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
- init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
+ init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | 0666, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
d_add(dentry, inode);
dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &fsi->last_ino);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index dcb976f98df2..8953440c6559 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -2945,11 +2945,11 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
{
int may = 0;
- if (flags & S_IRUGO)
+ if (flags & 0444)
may |= MAY_READ;
- if (flags & S_IWUGO)
+ if (flags & 0222)
may |= MAY_WRITE;
- if (flags & S_IXUGO)
+ if (flags & 0111)
may |= MAY_EXEC;
return may;
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
index f6482e53d55a..270cd3a308f0 100644
--- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -2857,55 +2857,53 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
static const struct tree_descr smack_files[] = {
[SMK_LOAD] = {
- "load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "load", &smk_load_ops, 0644},
[SMK_CIPSO] = {
- "cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, 0644},
[SMK_DOI] = {
- "doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "doi", &smk_doi_ops, 0644},
[SMK_DIRECT] = {
- "direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "direct", &smk_direct_ops, 0644},
[SMK_AMBIENT] = {
- "ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, 0644},
[SMK_NET4ADDR] = {
- "netlabel", &smk_net4addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "netlabel", &smk_net4addr_ops, 0644},
[SMK_ONLYCAP] = {
- "onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, 0644},
[SMK_LOGGING] = {
- "logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "logging", &smk_logging_ops, 0644},
[SMK_LOAD_SELF] = {
- "load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ "load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, 0666},
[SMK_ACCESSES] = {
- "access", &smk_access_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ "access", &smk_access_ops, 0666},
[SMK_MAPPED] = {
- "mapped", &smk_mapped_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "mapped", &smk_mapped_ops, 0644},
[SMK_LOAD2] = {
- "load2", &smk_load2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "load2", &smk_load2_ops, 0644},
[SMK_LOAD_SELF2] = {
- "load-self2", &smk_load_self2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ "load-self2", &smk_load_self2_ops, 0666},
[SMK_ACCESS2] = {
- "access2", &smk_access2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ "access2", &smk_access2_ops, 0666},
[SMK_CIPSO2] = {
- "cipso2", &smk_cipso2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "cipso2", &smk_cipso2_ops, 0644},
[SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ] = {
- "revoke-subject", &smk_revoke_subj_ops,
- S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "revoke-subject", &smk_revoke_subj_ops, 0644},
[SMK_CHANGE_RULE] = {
- "change-rule", &smk_change_rule_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "change-rule", &smk_change_rule_ops, 0644},
[SMK_SYSLOG] = {
- "syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, 0644},
[SMK_PTRACE] = {
- "ptrace", &smk_ptrace_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "ptrace", &smk_ptrace_ops, 0644},
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
[SMK_UNCONFINED] = {
- "unconfined", &smk_unconfined_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "unconfined", &smk_unconfined_ops, 0644},
#endif
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
[SMK_NET6ADDR] = {
- "ipv6host", &smk_net6addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ "ipv6host", &smk_net6addr_ops, 0644},
#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
[SMK_RELABEL_SELF] = {
- "relabel-self", &smk_relabel_self_ops,
- S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ "relabel-self", &smk_relabel_self_ops, 0666},
/* last one */
{""}
};
diff --git a/security/tomoyo/condition.c b/security/tomoyo/condition.c
index 8d0e1b9c9c57..2069f5912469 100644
--- a/security/tomoyo/condition.c
+++ b/security/tomoyo/condition.c
@@ -874,31 +874,31 @@ bool tomoyo_condition(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
value = S_ISVTX;
break;
case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_READ:
- value = S_IRUSR;
+ value = 0400;
break;
case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_WRITE:
- value = S_IWUSR;
+ value = 0200;
break;
case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_EXECUTE:
- value = S_IXUSR;
+ value = 0100;
break;
case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_READ:
- value = S_IRGRP;
+ value = 0040;
break;
case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_WRITE:
- value = S_IWGRP;
+ value = 0020;
break;
case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_EXECUTE:
- value = S_IXGRP;
+ value = 0010;
break;
case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_READ:
- value = S_IROTH;
+ value = 0004;
break;
case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_WRITE:
- value = S_IWOTH;
+ value = 0002;
break;
case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_EXECUTE:
- value = S_IXOTH;
+ value = 0001;
break;
case TOMOYO_EXEC_ARGC:
if (!bprm)
--
2.15.0