Re: [-next PATCH] security: use octal not symbolic permissions

From: Serge E. Hallyn
Date: Wed Jun 13 2018 - 11:19:31 EST

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Quoting Joe Perches (joe@xxxxxxxxxxx):
> Currently security files use a mixture of octal and symbolic styles
> for permissions.
>
> Using octal and not symbolic permissions is preferred by many as more
> readable.
>
> see: https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/2/1945

Heh, well see also https://lkml.org/lkml/2016/8/2/2062 . Your patch
definately improves readability, but will doubtless make backpointing
future important patches more painful.

> Prefer the direct use of octal for permissions.
>
> Done using:
>
> $ git ls-files security | \
> xargs ./scripts/checkpatch.pl -f --fix-inplace --types=symbolic_perms --strict
>
> and some typing.
>
> Before: $ git grep -P -w "0[0-7]{3,3}" security | wc -l
> 53
> After: $ git grep -P -w "0[0-7]{3,3}" security | wc -l
> 136
>
> Miscellanea:
>
> o Whitespace neatening and line wrapping around these conversions.
> o Remove now superfluous parentheses around direct use of 0600
>
> Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe@xxxxxxxxxxx>
> ---
> security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 5 ++--
> security/apparmor/lsm.c | 23 ++++++++---------
> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 +--
> security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 13 +++++-----
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 +--
> security/selinux/selinuxfs.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
> security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 6 ++---
> security/smack/smackfs.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++-----------------
> security/tomoyo/condition.c | 18 ++++++-------
> 9 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 91 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
> index 949dd8a48164..c09dc0f3c3fe 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c
> @@ -2426,10 +2426,9 @@ static int aa_mk_null_file(struct dentry *parent)
> }
>
> inode->i_ino = get_next_ino();
> - inode->i_mode = S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO;
> + inode->i_mode = S_IFCHR | 0666;
> inode->i_atime = inode->i_mtime = inode->i_ctime = current_time(inode);
> - init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO,
> - MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
> + init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | 0666, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
> d_instantiate(dentry, inode);
> aa_null.dentry = dget(dentry);
> aa_null.mnt = mntget(mount);
> diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> index fbb08bc78bee..6759a70918de 100644
> --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c
> @@ -1255,45 +1255,42 @@ static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp);
> /* AppArmor global enforcement switch - complain, enforce, kill */
> enum profile_mode aa_g_profile_mode = APPARMOR_ENFORCE;
> module_param_call(mode, param_set_mode, param_get_mode,
> - &aa_g_profile_mode, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
> + &aa_g_profile_mode, 0600);
>
> /* whether policy verification hashing is enabled */
> bool aa_g_hash_policy = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH_DEFAULT);
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH
> -module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
> +module_param_named(hash_policy, aa_g_hash_policy, aabool, 0600);
> #endif
>
> /* Debug mode */
> bool aa_g_debug = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_DEBUG_MESSAGES);
> -module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
> +module_param_named(debug, aa_g_debug, aabool, 0600);
>
> /* Audit mode */
> enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
> -module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit,
> - &aa_g_audit, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
> +module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, &aa_g_audit, 0600);
>
> /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This
> * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running
> */
> bool aa_g_audit_header = true;
> -module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool,
> - S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
> +module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, 0600);
>
> /* lock out loading/removal of policy
> * TODO: add in at boot loading of policy, which is the only way to
> * load policy, if lock_policy is set
> */
> bool aa_g_lock_policy;
> -module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy,
> - S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
> +module_param_named(lock_policy, aa_g_lock_policy, aalockpolicy, 0600);
>
> /* Syscall logging mode */
> bool aa_g_logsyscall;
> -module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR);
> +module_param_named(logsyscall, aa_g_logsyscall, aabool, 0600);
>
> /* Maximum pathname length before accesses will start getting rejected */
> unsigned int aa_g_path_max = 2 * PATH_MAX;
> -module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);
> +module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, 0400);
>
> /* Determines how paranoid loading of policy is and how much verification
> * on the loaded policy is done.
> @@ -1301,11 +1298,11 @@ module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR);
> * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy.
> */
> bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true;
> -module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO);
> +module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, 0444);
>
> /* Boot time disable flag */
> static bool apparmor_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
> -module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
> +module_param_named(enabled, apparmor_enabled, bool, 0444);
>
> static int __init apparmor_enabled_setup(char *str)
> {
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> index 354bb5716ce3..3f7707b8aaa7 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h
> @@ -314,9 +314,9 @@ static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
>
> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
> -#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS (S_IWUSR | S_IRUSR)
> +#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS 0600
> #else
> -#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS S_IWUSR
> +#define POLICY_FILE_FLAGS 0200
> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY */
>
> #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> index ae9d5c766a3c..81700df83f51 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
> @@ -439,7 +439,7 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
> #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY)
> clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags);
> #elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY)
> - inode->i_mode &= ~S_IWUSR;
> + inode->i_mode &= ~0200;
> #endif
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -465,28 +465,29 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
>
> binary_runtime_measurements =
> securityfs_create_file("binary_runtime_measurements",
> - S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
> + 0440, ima_dir, NULL,
> &ima_measurements_ops);
> if (IS_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements))
> goto out;
>
> ascii_runtime_measurements =
> securityfs_create_file("ascii_runtime_measurements",
> - S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
> + 0440, ima_dir, NULL,
> &ima_ascii_measurements_ops);
> if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements))
> goto out;
>
> runtime_measurements_count =
> securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count",
> - S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
> + 0440, ima_dir, NULL,
> &ima_measurements_count_ops);
> if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count))
> goto out;
>
> violations =
> - securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
> - ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops);
> + securityfs_create_file("violations",
> + 0440, ima_dir, NULL,
> + &ima_htable_violations_ops);
> if (IS_ERR(violations))
> goto out;
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index a85fac3345df..8ae043be8782 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -6336,9 +6336,9 @@ static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
> u32 av = 0;
>
> av = 0;
> - if (flag & S_IRUGO)
> + if (flag & 0444)
> av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
> - if (flag & S_IWUGO)
> + if (flag & 0222)
> av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
>
> if (av == 0)
> diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> index f3d374d2ca04..bfecac19ba92 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
> @@ -1376,7 +1376,7 @@ static int sel_make_bools(struct selinux_fs_info *fsi)
> goto out;
>
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | S_IRUGO | S_IWUSR);
> + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0644);
> if (!inode)
> goto out;
>
> @@ -1582,10 +1582,10 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
> int i;
> static const struct tree_descr files[] = {
> { "cache_threshold",
> - &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR },
> - { "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
> + &sel_avc_cache_threshold_ops, 0644 },
> + { "hash_stats", &sel_avc_hash_stats_ops, 0444 },
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS
> - { "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, S_IRUGO },
> + { "cache_stats", &sel_avc_cache_stats_ops, 0444 },
> #endif
> };
>
> @@ -1643,7 +1643,7 @@ static int sel_make_initcon_files(struct dentry *dir)
> if (!dentry)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
> + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0444);
> if (!inode)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> @@ -1744,7 +1744,7 @@ static int sel_make_perm_files(char *objclass, int classvalue,
> goto out;
>
> rc = -ENOMEM;
> - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
> + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0444);
> if (!inode)
> goto out;
>
> @@ -1774,7 +1774,7 @@ static int sel_make_class_dir_entries(char *classname, int index,
> if (!dentry)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG|S_IRUGO);
> + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFREG | 0444);
> if (!inode)
> return -ENOMEM;
>
> @@ -1870,7 +1870,7 @@ static struct dentry *sel_make_dir(struct dentry *dir, const char *name,
> if (!dentry)
> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>
> - inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFDIR | S_IRUGO | S_IXUGO);
> + inode = sel_make_inode(dir->d_sb, S_IFDIR | 0555);
> if (!inode) {
> dput(dentry);
> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
> @@ -1899,25 +1899,24 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
> struct inode_security_struct *isec;
>
> static const struct tree_descr selinux_files[] = {
> - [SEL_LOAD] = {"load", &sel_load_ops, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR},
> - [SEL_ENFORCE] = {"enforce", &sel_enforce_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> - [SEL_CONTEXT] = {"context", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
> - [SEL_ACCESS] = {"access", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
> - [SEL_CREATE] = {"create", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
> - [SEL_RELABEL] = {"relabel", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
> - [SEL_USER] = {"user", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
> - [SEL_POLICYVERS] = {"policyvers", &sel_policyvers_ops, S_IRUGO},
> - [SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS] = {"commit_pending_bools", &sel_commit_bools_ops, S_IWUSR},
> - [SEL_MLS] = {"mls", &sel_mls_ops, S_IRUGO},
> - [SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, S_IWUSR},
> - [SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
> - [SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> - [SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
> - [SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, S_IRUGO},
> - [SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, S_IRUGO},
> - [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, S_IRUGO},
> - [SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS] = {"validatetrans", &sel_transition_ops,
> - S_IWUGO},
> + [SEL_LOAD] = {"load", &sel_load_ops, 0600},
> + [SEL_ENFORCE] = {"enforce", &sel_enforce_ops, 0644},
> + [SEL_CONTEXT] = {"context", &transaction_ops, 0666},
> + [SEL_ACCESS] = {"access", &transaction_ops, 0666},
> + [SEL_CREATE] = {"create", &transaction_ops, 0666},
> + [SEL_RELABEL] = {"relabel", &transaction_ops, 0666},
> + [SEL_USER] = {"user", &transaction_ops, 0666},
> + [SEL_POLICYVERS] = {"policyvers", &sel_policyvers_ops, 0444},
> + [SEL_COMMIT_BOOLS] = {"commit_pending_bools", &sel_commit_bools_ops, 0200},
> + [SEL_MLS] = {"mls", &sel_mls_ops, 0444},
> + [SEL_DISABLE] = {"disable", &sel_disable_ops, 0200},
> + [SEL_MEMBER] = {"member", &transaction_ops, 0666},
> + [SEL_CHECKREQPROT] = {"checkreqprot", &sel_checkreqprot_ops, 0644},
> + [SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN] = {"reject_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, 0444},
> + [SEL_DENY_UNKNOWN] = {"deny_unknown", &sel_handle_unknown_ops, 0444},
> + [SEL_STATUS] = {"status", &sel_handle_status_ops, 0444},
> + [SEL_POLICY] = {"policy", &sel_policy_ops, 0444},
> + [SEL_VALIDATE_TRANS] = {"validatetrans", &sel_transition_ops, 0222},
> /* last one */ {""}
> };
>
> @@ -1943,7 +1942,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
> goto err;
>
> ret = -ENOMEM;
> - inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO);
> + inode = sel_make_inode(sb, S_IFCHR | 0666);
> if (!inode)
> goto err;
>
> @@ -1953,7 +1952,7 @@ static int sel_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
> isec->sclass = SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
> isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
>
> - init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | S_IRUGO | S_IWUGO, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
> + init_special_inode(inode, S_IFCHR | 0666, MKDEV(MEM_MAJOR, 3));
> d_add(dentry, inode);
>
> dentry = sel_make_dir(sb->s_root, "avc", &fsi->last_ino);
> diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> index dcb976f98df2..8953440c6559 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
> @@ -2945,11 +2945,11 @@ static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
> {
> int may = 0;
>
> - if (flags & S_IRUGO)
> + if (flags & 0444)
> may |= MAY_READ;
> - if (flags & S_IWUGO)
> + if (flags & 0222)
> may |= MAY_WRITE;
> - if (flags & S_IXUGO)
> + if (flags & 0111)
> may |= MAY_EXEC;
>
> return may;
> diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> index f6482e53d55a..270cd3a308f0 100644
> --- a/security/smack/smackfs.c
> +++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
> @@ -2857,55 +2857,53 @@ static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
>
> static const struct tree_descr smack_files[] = {
> [SMK_LOAD] = {
> - "load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "load", &smk_load_ops, 0644},
> [SMK_CIPSO] = {
> - "cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, 0644},
> [SMK_DOI] = {
> - "doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "doi", &smk_doi_ops, 0644},
> [SMK_DIRECT] = {
> - "direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "direct", &smk_direct_ops, 0644},
> [SMK_AMBIENT] = {
> - "ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, 0644},
> [SMK_NET4ADDR] = {
> - "netlabel", &smk_net4addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "netlabel", &smk_net4addr_ops, 0644},
> [SMK_ONLYCAP] = {
> - "onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, 0644},
> [SMK_LOGGING] = {
> - "logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "logging", &smk_logging_ops, 0644},
> [SMK_LOAD_SELF] = {
> - "load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
> + "load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, 0666},
> [SMK_ACCESSES] = {
> - "access", &smk_access_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
> + "access", &smk_access_ops, 0666},
> [SMK_MAPPED] = {
> - "mapped", &smk_mapped_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "mapped", &smk_mapped_ops, 0644},
> [SMK_LOAD2] = {
> - "load2", &smk_load2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "load2", &smk_load2_ops, 0644},
> [SMK_LOAD_SELF2] = {
> - "load-self2", &smk_load_self2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
> + "load-self2", &smk_load_self2_ops, 0666},
> [SMK_ACCESS2] = {
> - "access2", &smk_access2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
> + "access2", &smk_access2_ops, 0666},
> [SMK_CIPSO2] = {
> - "cipso2", &smk_cipso2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "cipso2", &smk_cipso2_ops, 0644},
> [SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ] = {
> - "revoke-subject", &smk_revoke_subj_ops,
> - S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "revoke-subject", &smk_revoke_subj_ops, 0644},
> [SMK_CHANGE_RULE] = {
> - "change-rule", &smk_change_rule_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "change-rule", &smk_change_rule_ops, 0644},
> [SMK_SYSLOG] = {
> - "syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, 0644},
> [SMK_PTRACE] = {
> - "ptrace", &smk_ptrace_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "ptrace", &smk_ptrace_ops, 0644},
> #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
> [SMK_UNCONFINED] = {
> - "unconfined", &smk_unconfined_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "unconfined", &smk_unconfined_ops, 0644},
> #endif
> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> [SMK_NET6ADDR] = {
> - "ipv6host", &smk_net6addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
> + "ipv6host", &smk_net6addr_ops, 0644},
> #endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
> [SMK_RELABEL_SELF] = {
> - "relabel-self", &smk_relabel_self_ops,
> - S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
> + "relabel-self", &smk_relabel_self_ops, 0666},
> /* last one */
> {""}
> };
> diff --git a/security/tomoyo/condition.c b/security/tomoyo/condition.c
> index 8d0e1b9c9c57..2069f5912469 100644
> --- a/security/tomoyo/condition.c
> +++ b/security/tomoyo/condition.c
> @@ -874,31 +874,31 @@ bool tomoyo_condition(struct tomoyo_request_info *r,
> value = S_ISVTX;
> break;
> case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_READ:
> - value = S_IRUSR;
> + value = 0400;
> break;
> case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_WRITE:
> - value = S_IWUSR;
> + value = 0200;
> break;
> case TOMOYO_MODE_OWNER_EXECUTE:
> - value = S_IXUSR;
> + value = 0100;
> break;
> case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_READ:
> - value = S_IRGRP;
> + value = 0040;
> break;
> case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_WRITE:
> - value = S_IWGRP;
> + value = 0020;
> break;
> case TOMOYO_MODE_GROUP_EXECUTE:
> - value = S_IXGRP;
> + value = 0010;
> break;
> case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_READ:
> - value = S_IROTH;
> + value = 0004;
> break;
> case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_WRITE:
> - value = S_IWOTH;
> + value = 0002;
> break;
> case TOMOYO_MODE_OTHERS_EXECUTE:
> - value = S_IXOTH;
> + value = 0001;
> break;
> case TOMOYO_EXEC_ARGC:
> if (!bprm)
> --
> 2.15.0

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