[PATCH v8 4/4] vsprintf: Add command line option debug_boot_weak_hash

[Tobin C. Harding]

Currently printing [hashed] pointers requires enough entropy to be
available.  Early in the boot sequence this may not be the case
resulting in a dummy string '(____ptrval____)' being printed.  This
makes debugging the early boot sequence difficult.  We can relax the
requirement to use cryptographically secure hashing during debugging.
This enables debugging while keeping development/production kernel
behaviour the same.

If new command line option debug_boot_weak_hash is enabled use
cryptographically insecure hashing and hash pointer value immediately.

Signed-off-by: Tobin C. Harding <me@xxxxxxxx>
Reviewed-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  9 +++++++++
 lib/vsprintf.c                                  | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 638342d0a095..a116fc0366b0 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -748,6 +748,15 @@
 
 	debug		[KNL] Enable kernel debugging (events log level).
 
+	debug_boot_weak_hash
+			[KNL] Enable printing pointers early in the boot
+			sequence.  If enabled, we use a weak hash instead of
+			siphash to hash pointers.  Use this option if you need
+			to see pointer values during early boot (i.e you are
+			seeing instances of '(___ptrval___)').
+			Cryptographically insecure, please do not use on
+			production kernels.
+
 	debug_locks_verbose=
 			[KNL] verbose self-tests
 			Format=<0|1>
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c
index c445f9f28760..17ebe076ae41 100644
--- a/lib/vsprintf.c
+++ b/lib/vsprintf.c
@@ -1651,6 +1651,17 @@ char *device_node_string(char *buf, char *end, struct device_node *dn,
 	return widen_string(buf, buf - buf_start, end, spec);
 }
 
+/* Make pointers available for printing early in the boot sequence. */
+static int debug_boot_weak_hash __ro_after_init;
+
+static int __init debug_boot_weak_hash_enable(char *str)
+{
+	debug_boot_weak_hash = 1;
+	pr_info("debug_boot_weak_hash enabled\n");
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("debug_boot_weak_hash", debug_boot_weak_hash_enable);
+
 static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(not_filled_random_ptr_key);
 static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly;
 
@@ -1703,6 +1714,12 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec)
 	const char *str = sizeof(ptr) == 8 ? "(____ptrval____)" : "(ptrval)";
 	unsigned long hashval;
 
+	/* When debugging early boot use non-cryptographically secure hash */
+	if (unlikely(debug_boot_weak_hash)) {
+		hashval = hash_long((unsigned long)ptr, 32);
+		return pointer_string(buf, end, (const void *)hashval, spec);
+	}
+
 	if (static_branch_unlikely(&not_filled_random_ptr_key)) {
 		spec.field_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr);
 		/* string length must be less than default_width */
-- 
2.17.1