Re: [PATCH v3 02/17] khwasan: move common kasan and khwasan code to common.c

From: kbuild test robot
Date: Wed Jun 20 2018 - 16:37:49 EST

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In reply to: Andrey Konovalov: "[PATCH v3 02/17] khwasan: move common kasan and khwasan code to common.c"
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Hi Andrey,

Thank you for the patch! Yet something to improve:

[auto build test ERROR on mmotm/master]
[also build test ERROR on v4.18-rc1 next-20180620]
[if your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, please drop us a note to help improve the system]

url: https://github.com/0day-ci/linux/commits/Andrey-Konovalov/khwasan-kernel-hardware-assisted-address-sanitizer/20180621-035912
base: git://git.cmpxchg.org/linux-mmotm.git master
config: x86_64-randconfig-x011-201824 (attached as .config)
compiler: gcc-7 (Debian 7.3.0-16) 7.3.0
reproduce:
# save the attached .config to linux build tree
make ARCH=x86_64

Note: the linux-review/Andrey-Konovalov/khwasan-kernel-hardware-assisted-address-sanitizer/20180621-035912 HEAD 0e30ed7118e854b38bb6ab96365e7c74a2518290 builds fine.
It only hurts bisectibility.

All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> mm//kasan/report.c:42:20: error: conflicting types for 'find_first_bad_addr'
static const void *find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from mm//kasan/report.c:33:0:
mm//kasan/kasan.h:130:7: note: previous declaration of 'find_first_bad_addr' was here
void *find_first_bad_addr(void *addr, size_t size);
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> mm//kasan/report.c:54:13: error: conflicting types for 'addr_has_shadow'
static bool addr_has_shadow(struct kasan_access_info *info)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from mm//kasan/report.c:33:0:
mm//kasan/kasan.h:120:20: note: previous definition of 'addr_has_shadow' was here
static inline bool addr_has_shadow(const void *addr)
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
mm//kasan/report.c: In function 'get_shadow_bug_type':
mm//kasan/report.c:86:2: error: duplicate case value
case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
^~~~
mm//kasan/report.c:85:2: note: previously used here
case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
^~~~
mm//kasan/report.c:98:2: error: duplicate case value
case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
^~~~
mm//kasan/report.c:85:2: note: previously used here
case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
^~~~
mm//kasan/report.c:99:2: error: duplicate case value
case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
^~~~
mm//kasan/report.c:85:2: note: previously used here
case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
^~~~
mm//kasan/report.c: At top level:
>> mm//kasan/report.c:128:20: error: static declaration of 'get_bug_type' follows non-static declaration
static const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
^~~~~~~~~~~~
In file included from mm//kasan/report.c:33:0:
mm//kasan/kasan.h:131:13: note: previous declaration of 'get_bug_type' was here
const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info);
^~~~~~~~~~~~

vim +/find_first_bad_addr +42 mm//kasan/report.c

0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 41
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 @42 static const void *find_first_bad_addr(const void *addr, size_t size)
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 43 {
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 44 u8 shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr);
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 45 const void *first_bad_addr = addr;
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 46
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 47 while (!shadow_val && first_bad_addr < addr + size) {
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 48 first_bad_addr += KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE;
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 49 shadow_val = *(u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(first_bad_addr);
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 50 }
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 51 return first_bad_addr;
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 52 }
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 53
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 @54 static bool addr_has_shadow(struct kasan_access_info *info)
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 55 {
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 56 return (info->access_addr >=
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 57 kasan_shadow_to_mem((void *)KASAN_SHADOW_START));
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 58 }
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 59
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 60 static const char *get_shadow_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 61 {
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 62 const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 63 u8 *shadow_addr;
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 64
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 65 info->first_bad_addr = find_first_bad_addr(info->access_addr,
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 66 info->access_size);
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 67
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 68 shadow_addr = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(info->first_bad_addr);
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 69
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 70 /*
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 71 * If shadow byte value is in [0, KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE) we can look
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 72 * at the next shadow byte to determine the type of the bad access.
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 73 */
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 74 if (*shadow_addr > 0 && *shadow_addr <= KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1)
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 75 shadow_addr++;
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 76
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 77 switch (*shadow_addr) {
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 78 case 0 ... KASAN_SHADOW_SCALE_SIZE - 1:
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 79 /*
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 80 * In theory it's still possible to see these shadow values
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 81 * due to a data race in the kernel code.
cdf6a273 Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 82 */
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 83 bug_type = "out-of-bounds";
b8c73fc2 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 84 break;
0316bec2 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 85 case KASAN_PAGE_REDZONE:
0316bec2 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 86 case KASAN_KMALLOC_REDZONE:
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 87 bug_type = "slab-out-of-bounds";
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 88 break;
bebf56a1 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 89 case KASAN_GLOBAL_REDZONE:
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 90 bug_type = "global-out-of-bounds";
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 91 break;
c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 92 case KASAN_STACK_LEFT:
c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 93 case KASAN_STACK_MID:
c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 94 case KASAN_STACK_RIGHT:
c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 95 case KASAN_STACK_PARTIAL:
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 96 bug_type = "stack-out-of-bounds";
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 97 break;
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 98 case KASAN_FREE_PAGE:
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 @99 case KASAN_KMALLOC_FREE:
0952d87f Andrey Konovalov 2015-11-05 100 bug_type = "use-after-free";
c420f167 Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 101 break;
828347f8 Dmitry Vyukov 2016-11-30 102 case KASAN_USE_AFTER_SCOPE:
828347f8 Dmitry Vyukov 2016-11-30 103 bug_type = "use-after-scope";
828347f8 Dmitry Vyukov 2016-11-30 104 break;
342061ee Paul Lawrence 2018-02-06 105 case KASAN_ALLOCA_LEFT:
342061ee Paul Lawrence 2018-02-06 106 case KASAN_ALLOCA_RIGHT:
342061ee Paul Lawrence 2018-02-06 107 bug_type = "alloca-out-of-bounds";
342061ee Paul Lawrence 2018-02-06 108 break;
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 109 }
0b24becc Andrey Ryabinin 2015-02-13 110
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 111 return bug_type;
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 112 }
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 113
822d5ec2 Colin Ian King 2017-07-10 114 static const char *get_wild_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 115 {
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 116 const char *bug_type = "unknown-crash";
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 117
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 118 if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < PAGE_SIZE)
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 119 bug_type = "null-ptr-deref";
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 120 else if ((unsigned long)info->access_addr < TASK_SIZE)
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 121 bug_type = "user-memory-access";
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 122 else
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 123 bug_type = "wild-memory-access";
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 124
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 125 return bug_type;
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 126 }
5e82cd12 Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 127
7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 @128 static const char *get_bug_type(struct kasan_access_info *info)
7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 129 {
7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 130 if (addr_has_shadow(info))
7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 131 return get_shadow_bug_type(info);
7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 132 return get_wild_bug_type(info);
7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 133 }
7d418f7b Andrey Konovalov 2017-05-03 134

:::::: The code at line 42 was first introduced by commit
:::::: 0b24becc810dc3be6e3f94103a866f214c282394 kasan: add kernel address sanitizer infrastructure

:::::: TO: Andrey Ryabinin <a.ryabinin@xxxxxxxxxxx>
:::::: CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>

---
0-DAY kernel test infrastructure Open Source Technology Center
https://lists.01.org/pipermail/kbuild-all Intel Corporation

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Next message: Kees Cook: "Re: [PATCH 11/11] crypto: skcipher: Remove VLA usage for SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK"
Previous message: Kees Cook: "Re: [PATCH 01/11] crypto: shash: Remove VLA usage"
In reply to: Andrey Konovalov: "[PATCH v3 02/17] khwasan: move common kasan and khwasan code to common.c"
Next in thread: Andrey Konovalov: "Re: [PATCH v3 02/17] khwasan: move common kasan and khwasan code to common.c"
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