Re: [PATCH 1/1] arm64/mm: move {idmap_pg_dir,tramp_pg_dir,swapper_pg_dir} to .rodata section

[Jun Yao]

On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 11:29:52AM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> On 21 June 2018 at 10:59, James Morse <james.morse@xxxxxxx> wrote:
> > On 21/06/18 07:39, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >> On 21 June 2018 at 04:51, Jun Yao <yaojun8558363@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>> On Wed, Jun 20, 2018 at 12:09:49PM +0200, Ard Biesheuvel wrote:
> >>>> On 20 June 2018 at 10:57, Jun Yao <yaojun8558363@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> >>>> As for swapper_pg_dir, it would indeed be nice if we could keep those
> >>>> mappings read-only most of the time, but I'm not sure how useful this
> >>>> is if we apply it to the root level only.
> >>>
> >>> The purpose of it is to make 'KSMA' harder, where an single arbitrary
> >>> write is used to add a block mapping to the page-tables, giving the
> >>> attacker full access to kernel memory. That's why we just apply it to
> >>> the root level only. If the attacker can arbitrary write multiple times,
> >>> I think it's hard to defend.
> >>>
> >>
> >> So the assumption is that the root level is more easy to find?
> >> Otherwise, I'm not sure I understand why being able to write a level 0
> >> entry is so harmful, given that we don't have block mappings at that
> >> level.
> >
> > I think this thing assumes 3-level page tables with 39bit VA.
> >
> 
> The attack, you mean? Because this code is unlikely to build with that
> configuration, given that __pgd_populate() BUILD_BUG()s in that case.

I think this configuration may be ok. I find that the kernel on Google
pixel 2 XL is built with 3-level page tables with 39-bit VA.