Re: [PATCH] tracing: do not leak kernel addresses

[Steven Rostedt]

On Thu, 26 Jul 2018 08:14:08 -0700
Mark Salyzyn <salyzyn@xxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

> Thank you Steve, much appreciated feedback, I have asked the security 
> developers to keep this in mind and come up with a correct fix.
> 
> The correct fix that meets your guidelines would _not_ be suitable for 
> stable due to the invasiveness it sounds, only for the latest will such 
> a rework make sense. As such, the fix proposed in this patch is the only 
> one that meets the bar for stable patch simplicity, and merely(!) needs 
> to state that if the fix is taken, perf and trace are broken.
> 
> Posting this patch publicly on the lists, that may never be applied, may 
> be the limit of our responsibility for a fix to stable kernel releases, 
> to be optionally applied by vendors concerned with this CVE criteria?
>

The patch breaks the code it touches. It makes it useless. If you want
something for stable, add a command line parameter that just disables
the creation of that file. Otherwise you will break usespace and that
will be a definitely NAK from Linus, and for stable itself. This is a
very minor security issue, and does not justify breaking userspace
applications. I would be very upset if a new stable release broke both
perf and trace-cmd's ability to read certain trace events.

-- Steve