[PATCH 4.4 11/23] ip: in cmsg IP(V6)_ORIGDSTADDR call pskb_may_pull

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.4-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@xxxxxxxxxx>

[ Upstream commit 2efd4fca703a6707cad16ab486eaab8fc7f0fd49 ]

Syzbot reported a read beyond the end of the skb head when returning
IPV6_ORIGDSTADDR:

  BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242
  CPU: 0 PID: 4501 Comm: syz-executor128 Not tainted 4.17.0+ #9
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS
  Google 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
    __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
    dump_stack+0x185/0x1d0 lib/dump_stack.c:113
    kmsan_report+0x188/0x2a0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1125
    kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x138/0x1f0 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1219
    kmsan_copy_to_user+0x7a/0x160 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:1261
    copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:184 [inline]
    put_cmsg+0x5ef/0x860 net/core/scm.c:242
    ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl+0x1cf3/0x1eb0 net/ipv6/datagram.c:719
    ip6_datagram_recv_ctl+0x41c/0x450 net/ipv6/datagram.c:733
    rawv6_recvmsg+0x10fb/0x1460 net/ipv6/raw.c:521
    [..]

This logic and its ipv4 counterpart read the destination port from
the packet at skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4.

With MSG_MORE and a local SOCK_RAW sender, syzbot was able to cook a
packet that stores headers exactly up to skb_transport_offset(skb) in
the head and the remainder in a frag.

Call pskb_may_pull before accessing the pointer to ensure that it lies
in skb head.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAF=yD-LEJwZj5a1-bAAj2Oy_hKmGygV6rsJ_WOrAYnv-fnayiQ@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Reported-by: syzbot+9adb4b567003cac781f0@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c |    7 +++++--
 net/ipv6/datagram.c    |    7 +++++--
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
@@ -135,15 +135,18 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr(struct
 {
 	struct sockaddr_in sin;
 	const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
-	__be16 *ports = (__be16 *)skb_transport_header(skb);
+	__be16 *ports;
+	int end;
 
-	if (skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4 > skb->len)
+	end = skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4;
+	if (end > 0 && !pskb_may_pull(skb, end))
 		return;
 
 	/* All current transport protocols have the port numbers in the
 	 * first four bytes of the transport header and this function is
 	 * written with this assumption in mind.
 	 */
+	ports = (__be16 *)skb_transport_header(skb);
 
 	sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
 	sin.sin_addr.s_addr = iph->daddr;
--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
@@ -657,13 +657,16 @@ void ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(stru
 	}
 	if (np->rxopt.bits.rxorigdstaddr) {
 		struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
-		__be16 *ports = (__be16 *) skb_transport_header(skb);
+		__be16 *ports;
+		int end;
 
-		if (skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4 <= skb->len) {
+		end = skb_transport_offset(skb) + 4;
+		if (end <= 0 || pskb_may_pull(skb, end)) {
 			/* All current transport protocols have the port numbers in the
 			 * first four bytes of the transport header and this function is
 			 * written with this assumption in mind.
 			 */
+			ports = (__be16 *)skb_transport_header(skb);
 
 			sin6.sin6_family = AF_INET6;
 			sin6.sin6_addr = ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr;