Re: [RFC 0/4] Virtio uses DMA API for all devices

[Michael S. Tsirkin]

On Fri, Aug 03, 2018 at 10:58:36AM -0500, Benjamin Herrenschmidt wrote:
> On Fri, 2018-08-03 at 00:05 -0700, Christoph Hellwig wrote:
> > >   2- Make virtio use the DMA API with our custom platform-provided
> > > swiotlb callbacks when needed, that is when not using IOMMU *and*
> > > running on a secure VM in our case.
> > 
> > And total NAK the customer platform-provided part of this.  We need
> > a flag passed in from the hypervisor that the device needs all bus
> > specific dma api treatment, and then just use the normal plaform
> > dma mapping setup. 
> 
> Christoph, as I have explained already, we do NOT have a way to provide
> such a flag as neither the hypervisor nor qemu knows anything about
> this when the VM is created.

I think the fact you can't add flags from the hypervisor is
a sign of a problematic architecture, you should look at
adding that down the road - you will likely need it at some point.

However in this specific case, the flag does not need to come from the
hypervisor, it can be set by arch boot code I think.
Christoph do you see a problem with that?

> >  To get swiotlb you'll need to then use the DT/ACPI
> > dma-range property to limit the addressable range, and a swiotlb
> > capable plaform will use swiotlb automatically.
> 
> This cannot be done as you describe it.
> 
> The VM is created as a *normal* VM. The DT stuff is generated by qemu
> at a point where it has *no idea* that the VM will later become secure
> and thus will have to restrict which pages can be used for "DMA".
> 
> The VM will *at runtime* turn itself into a secure VM via interactions
> with the security HW and the Ultravisor layer (which sits below the
> HV). This happens way after the DT has been created and consumed, the
> qemu devices instanciated etc...
> 
> Only the guest kernel knows because it initates the transition. When
> that happens, the virtio devices have already been used by the guest
> firmware, bootloader, possibly another kernel that kexeced the "secure"
> one, etc... 
> 
> So instead of running around saying NAK NAK NAK, please explain how we
> can solve that differently.
> 
> Ben.
>