[PATCH] docs: provide more details about security bug reporting

From: Willy Tarreau
Date: Fri Aug 10 2018 - 10:36:04 EST

The analysis, disclosure and crediting parts were completed a bit to
add clarification about what types of reports are expected, what the
reporter may expect in terms of disclosure, and how reporters are
credited for their discovery.

Signed-off-by: Willy Tarreau <w@xxxxxx>
Acked-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst | 81 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 81 insertions(+)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
index 30491d9..91ecd48 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/security-bugs.rst
@@ -26,6 +26,51 @@ information is helpful. Any exploit code is very helpful and will not
be released without consent from the reporter unless it has already been
made public.

+Sometimes a bug will be very well understood by some of the security
+officers who will propose you a patch to test. Please get prepared to
+receiving extra questions and to provide answers on a timely basis.
+There is little chance a bug will get fixed if you send an incomplete
+report and disappear for two weeks. It is also possible that some of
+the officers will conclude that the behaviour you observed is normal
+and expected, that it is bogus but doesn't present an imminent
+security risk and should rather be discussed on public lists, or that
+it does indeed represent a risk, but that the risk of breakage induced
+by fixing it outweights the risks of the bug being exploited. In such
+situations, it is possible that you will be requested to post your
+report to another more suitable place.
+Analysing a report takes a lot of time, and while sometimes it's
+better to conclude to a wrong alert because there is nothing to fix,
+it also is annoying if it is discovered that the reporter should have
+found it by himself, because the time lost on this analysis was not
+spent on another one. This can happen all the time to be wrong about
+a report, but please be careful not to do this too often or your
+reports may not be taken seriously in the end.
+As a rule of thumb, it is recommended not to post messages suggesting
+that a bug may exist somewhere. Since the security team manages
+imminent and important risks, bugs reported there must be based on
+facts and not on beliefs. It is fine to report a panic message saying
+"I just got this, I don't know how it happened but it scares me", it is
+not fine to say "I ran my new automated analysis tool which thinks a
+check is missing here, could someone knowledgeable in this area please
+double-check". The security team's role is not to have opinions on
+your beliefs but to spot the right people to help fix a real problem.
+Very often, some maintainers will be brought to the discussion as the
+analysis progresses. Most of the time these people will not have received
+the initial e-mail, and they're discovering the issue late. So please do
+not get upset if they ask questions that were already addressed or which
+were present in the initial report.
+Also, don't consider the bug fixed until the fix is merged. It can
+happen that a fix proposed by one of the security officers doesn't suit
+a subsystem maintainer and that it has to be reworked differently,
+possibly after a public discussion.

@@ -44,6 +89,25 @@ timeframe varies from immediate (esp. if it's already publicly known bug)
to a few weeks. As a basic default policy, we expect report date to
release date to be on the order of 7 days.

+There is no point threatening to make a report public after XX days
+without a response because usually what you will end up with is a fix
+that is merged much earlier than what you possibly expected, for example
+if you promised to someone not to publish it before a certain date.
+Please just understand that the security team's goal is for your bug to
+be fixed as fast as possible and not to sleep on it.
+If you report a particularly complex issue that you intend to discuss
+at a conference a few weeks or months later, you cannot really expect
+from the security team to find a solution in time and at the same time
+to refrain from disclosing the issue to a broader audience or
+releasing the fix. So at the very least you will have to take your
+dispositions to deal with a disclosure which happens much earlier than
+your public talk about the issue. Also if you only sent an early
+notification about a forthcoming problem that is not yet fully
+disclosed, you must not expect the security officers to ping you again
+later about the issue; you are responsible for reloading the
+discussion at the right moment once all elements are gathered.

@@ -59,6 +123,23 @@ include linux-distros from the start. In this case, remember to prefix
the email Subject line with "[vs]" as described in the linux-distros wiki:

+Crediting the reporter
+The security team has a great respect for reporters' work and wants to
+encourage high-quality reports that help fix real issues. As such, the
+reporter will usually be asked who must be credited for reporting the
+bug before writing the final patch. It is often not well perceived to
+send a report and start by explaining whom to credit for the report, as
+experience shows that people who focus a bit too much on being properly
+credited when they don't know yet if what they found is a valid bug tend
+not to provide the highest quality reports nor to interact the best with
+the team. So the best way to be properly credited is to provide a patch
+with an appropriate commit message along with the analysis. The second
+best way is to stay humble and participate with the rest of the team to
+the bug fixing session. It will bring you a lot of respect and will help
+your future reports get more attention.
CVE assignment