[PATCH 4.14 095/104] x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

4.14-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>

commit ea156d192f5257a5bf393d33910d3b481bf8a401 upstream

Three changes to the content of the sysfs file:

 - If EPT is disabled, L1TF cannot be exploited even across threads on the
   same core, and SMT is irrelevant.

 - If mitigation is completely disabled, and SMT is enabled, print "vulnerable"
   instead of "vulnerable, SMT vulnerable"

 - Reorder the two parts so that the main vulnerability state comes first
   and the detail on SMT is second.

Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@xxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   12 +++++++++---
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -738,9 +738,15 @@ static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf
 	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO)
 		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
 
-	return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: SMT %s, L1D %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
-		       cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled",
-		       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
+	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED ||
+	    (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER &&
+	     cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED))
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
+			       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: %s, SMT %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
+		       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation],
+		       cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
 }
 #else
 static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)