Re: [PATCH v5 3/3] overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred
From: Randy Dunlap
Date: Tue Aug 28 2018 - 14:09:55 EST
On 08/28/2018 09:53 AM, Mark Salyzyn wrote:
> diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
> index 72615a2c0752..953e52971eb0 100644
> --- a/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/filesystems/overlayfs.txt
> @@ -106,6 +106,35 @@ Only the lists of names from directories are merged. Other content
> such as metadata and extended attributes are reported for the upper
> directory only. These attributes of the lower directory are hidden.
> +By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the
> +recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are
> +checked against the caller's credentials.
> +If the principles of least privilege are applied, the mounter's
> +credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's when
> +accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a lower
> +DAC privileged caller can execute, but is MAC denied to the
> +generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector
> +executing with the increased privileges of the mounter. One option is
> +to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all subsequent
> +operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the caller's
> +credentials. This option default is set in the CONFIG
> +OVERLAY_FS_OVERRIDE_CREDS or in the module option override_creds.
> +Fundamentally The mounter has privileges, its ability to execute,
but this entire sentence is jumbled and awkward and could use some work.
I tried to come up with something but I can't quite get what is intended here.
> +for example, files and grant them these higher privileges is to be
> +blocked except to lower privileged and appropriate callers. This
> +option turned off permits this kind of security policy.
> +With override_creds turned off, several unintended side effects will
> +occur. The caller with a lower privilege will not be able to delete
> +files or directories, create nodes, or search some directories. The
> +uneven security model where upperdir and workdir are opened at
> +privilege, but accessed without, should only be used with strict
> +understanding of the side effects and of the security policies.
> whiteouts and opaque directories